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While substantial research literatures seek to characterize optimal mone-
tary and fiscal policy, respectively, the two branches of the literature have
largely developed in isolation, and on apparently contradictory founda-
tions. The modern literature on dynamically optimal fiscal policy often
abstracts from monetary aspects of the economy altogether and so implic-
itly allows no useful role for monetary policy. When monetary policy is
considered within the theory of optimal fiscal policy, it is most often in the
context of models with flexible prices. In these models, monetary policy
matters only because (1) the level of nominal interest rates (and hence the
opportunity cost of holding money) determines the size of certain distor-
tions that result from the attempt to economize on money balances, and
(2) the way the price level varies in response to real disturbances deter-
mines the state-contingent real payoffs on (riskless) nominally denomi-
nated government debt, which may facilitate tax-smoothing in the case
that explicitly state-contingent debt is not available. The literature on opti-
mal monetary policy has instead been mainly concerned with quite dis-
tinct objectives for monetary stabilization policy, namely, the minimization
of the distortions that result from prices or wages that do not adjust
quickly enough to clear markets. At the same time, this literature typically
ignores the fiscal consequences of alternative monetary policies; the char-
acterizations of optimal monetary policy obtained are thus strictly correct
only for a world in which lump-sum taxes are available.
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Here we wish to consider the way in which the conclusions reached in
each of these two familiar fields of study must be modified if one takes
simultaneous account of the basic elements of the policy problems
addressed in each. On the one hand, we wish to consider how conven-
tional conclusions with regard to the nature of an optimal monetary pol-
icy rule must be modified if one recognizes that the government's only
sources of revenue are distorting taxes, so that the fiscal consequences of
monetary policy matter for welfare. And, on the other hand, we wish to
consider how conventional conclusions with regard to optimal tax policy
must be modified if one recognizes that prices do not instantaneously
clear markets, so that output determination depends on aggregate
demand, in addition to the supply-side factors stressed in the conven-
tional theory of optimal taxation.
Several recent papers have also sought to consider optimal monetary
and fiscal policy jointly, in the context of models with sticky prices; impor-
tant examples include Correia et al. (2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2001), and Siu (2001). Our approach differs from those taken in these
papers, however, in several respects. First, we model price stickiness in a
different way than in any of these papers, namely, by assuming staggered
pricing of the kind introduced by Calvo (1983). This particular form of
price stickiness has been widely used both in analyses of optimal mone-
tary policy in models with explicit microfoundations (e.g., Goodfriend
and King, 1997; Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003) and in the empirical
literature on optimizing models of the monetary transmission mechanism
(e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Gali and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone,
2002).
Perhaps more important, we obtain analytical results rather than purely
numerical ones. To obtain these results, we propose a linear-quadratic
approach to the characterization of optimal monetary and fiscal policy
that allows us to nest both conventional analyses of optimal monetary
policy, such as that of Clarida et al. (1999), and analyses of optimal tax-
smoothing in the spirit of Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and
Aiyagari et al. (2002) as special cases of our more general framework. We
show how a linear-quadratic policy problem can be derived to yield a cor-
rect linear approximation to the optimal policy rules from the point of
view of the maximization of expected discounted utility in a dynamic sto-
chastic general-equilibrium model, building on our earlier work (Benigno
and Woodford, 2003) for the case of optimal monetary policy when lump-
sum taxes are available.
Finally, we do not content ourselves with merely characterizing the opti-
mal dynamic responses of our policy instruments (and other state vari-
ables) to shocks under an optimal policy, given one assumption or anotherOptimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 273
about the nature and statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances
to our model economy. Instead, we also wish to derive policy rules that the
monetary and fiscal authorities may reasonably commit themselves to fol-
low as a way of implementing the optimal equilibrium. In particular, we
seek to characterize optimal policy in terms of optimal targeting rules for
monetary and fiscal policy, of the kind proposed in the case of monetary
policy by Svensson (1999), Svensson and Woodford (2003), and Giannoni
and Woodford (2002, 2003). The rules are specified in terms of a target cri-
terion for each authority; each authority commits itself to use its policy
instrument each period in whatever way is necessary to allow it to project
an evolution of the economy consistent with its target criterion. As dis-
cussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2002), we can derive rules of this form
that are not merely consistent with the desired equilibrium responses to
disturbances, but that in addition (1) imply a determinate rational-expec-
tations equilibrium, so that there are not other equally possible (but less
desirable) equilibria consistent with the same policy; and (2) bring about
optimal responses to shocks regardless of the character of and statistical
properties of the exogenous disturbances in the model.
1. The Policy Problem
Here we describe our assumptions about the economic environment and
pose the optimization problem that joint optimal monetary and fiscal
policies are intended to solve. The approximation method that we use to
characterize the solution to this problem is then presented in the follow-
ing section. Additional details of the derivation of the structural equations
of our model of nominal price rigidity can be found in Woodford (2003,
Chapter 3).
The goal of policy is assumed to be the maximization of the level of
expected utility of a representative household. In our model, each house-
hold seeks to maximize:
Ut0 = Et0 (1)
where Q is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a contin-




with an elasticity of substitution equal to 9 > 1, and Ht(j) is the quantity
supplied of labor of type;'. Each differentiated good is supplied by a sin-
gle monopolistically competitive producer. There are assumed to be many274 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
goods in each of an infinite number of industries; the goods in each indus-
try j are produced using a type of labor that is specific to that industry,
and they also change their prices at the same time. The representative
household supplies all types of labor as well as consumes all types of
goods.
1 To simplify the algebraic form of our results, we restrict attention
in this paper to the case of isoelastic functional forms:
~ 1-CT-
1
_ 1 nl +
where <7, v > 0, and {Cf, Ht} are bounded exogenous disturbance processes.
(We use the notation ^( to refer to the complete vector of exogenous dis-
turbances, including Cf, and Ht.)
We assume a common technology for the production of all goods, in
which (industry-specific) labor is the only variable input:
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and § > 1. Inverting
the production function to write the demand for each type of labor as a
function of the quantities produced of the various differentiated goods,
and using the identity:
Yt = Ct + Gt
to substitute for Ct, where Gt is exogenous government demand for the
composite good, we can write the utility of the representative household
as a function of the expected production plan {yt(i)}.
2
We can also express the relative quantities demanded of the differenti-
ated goods each period as a function of their relative prices. This allows
1. We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor sup-
plied; in the presence of perfect sharing of labor income risk across households, household
decisions regarding consumption and labor supply would all be as assumed here.
2. The government is assumed to need to obtain an exogeneously given quantity of the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate each period and to obtain this in a cost-minimizing fashion.
Hence, the government allocates its purchases across the suppliers of differentiated goods
in the same proportion as do households, and the index of aggregate demand Yt is the
same function of the individual quantities {y,(01
 as C, is of the individual quantities con-
sumed {c,(01/ defined in equation (2).Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 275
us to write the utility flow to the representative household in the form
U (Yt/ At; £t), where:
is a measure of price dispersion at date t, in which Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz
price index:
Pt = (4)
and the vector £f now includes the exogenous disturbances Gt and At as
well as the preference shocks. Hence, we can write equation (1) as:
00
Ut0 = Et0 Z P'-'olKY^A,.;^) (5)
t = t0
The producers in each industry fix the prices of their goods in monetary
units for a random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing
introduced by Calvo (1983). We let 0 < a < 1 be the fraction of prices that
remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that changes its price in
period t chooses its new price pt (i) to maximize:
T= t (6)
where QtT is the stochastic discount factor by which financial markets dis-
count random nominal income in period T to determine the nominal
value of a claim to such income in period t, and oc
T~
f is the probability that
a price chosen in period t will not have been revised by period T. In equi-
librium, this discount factor is given by the following equation:
n _ nT_,Mc(CT;qT) Pt . .
The function Tl(p, p, P; Y, i, ^), defined in the appendix in Section 7,
indicates the after-tax nominal profits of a supplier with price p, in an
industry with common price ft, when the aggregate price index is equal
to P, aggregate demand is equal to Y, and sales revenues are taxed at rate
x. Profits are equal to after-tax sales revenues net of the wage bill, and the
real wage demanded for labor of type j is assumed to be given by:276 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
where \L™ > 1 is an exogenous markup factor in the labor market (allowed
to vary over time but assumed to be common to all labor markets),
3 and
firms are assumed to be wage-takers. We allow for wage markup varia-
tions to include the possibility of a pure cost-push shock that affects equi-
librium pricing behavior while implying no change in the efficient
allocation of resources. Note that variation in the tax rate xt has a similar
effect on this pricing problem (and hence on supply behavior); this is the
sole distortion associated with tax policy in the present model.
Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t choose the same
new price p*. Under our assumed functional forms, the optimal choice has
a closed-form solution:
l + co9)
where co = (() (1 + v) -1 > 0 is the elasticity of real marginal cost in an indus-
try with respect to industry output, and Ft and Kf are functions of current
aggregate output Yt; the current tax rate xt; the current exogenous state £,;
and the expected future evolution of inflation, output, taxes, and distur-
bances, defined in the appendix.
4
The price index then evolves according to a law of motion:
r -.1/(1-0)
Pt = (l-aK'^ + aP'-V (10)
as a consequence of equation (4). Substitution of equation (9) into equa-








where nt = Pt /Pt _ L This defines a short-run aggregate supply relation between inflation and output, given the current tax rate xt; current distur-
bances \t) and expectations regarding future inflation, output, taxes, and
disturbances. Because the relative prices of the industries that do not
change their prices in period t remain the same, we can also use equation
(10) to derive a law of motion of the form:
A, = fc(At_I#n,) (12)
3. In the case where we assume that \a" = 1 at all times, our model is one in which both
households and firms are wage-takers, or there is efficient contracting between them.
4. The disturbance vector h,t is now understood to include the current value of the wage
markup \i™.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 277
for the dispersion measure defined in equation (3). This is the source in
our model of welfare losses from inflation or deflation.
We abstract here from any monetary frictions that would account for a
demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate of return.
We nonetheless assume that the central bank can control the riskless
short-term nominal interest rate it, which is in turn related to other finan-
cial asset prices through the arbitrage relation:
5
We shall assume that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
never binds under the optimal policies considered below.
6 Thus, we need
not introduce any additional constraint on the possible paths of output
and prices associated with a need for the chosen evolution of prices to be
consistent with a nonnegative nominal interest rate.
Our abstraction from monetary frictions, and hence from the existence
of seignorage revenues, does not mean that monetary policy has no fiscal
consequences because interest-rate policy and the equilibrium inflation
that results from it have implications for the real burden of government
debt. For simplicity, we shall assume that all public debt consists of risk-
less nominal one-period bonds. The nominal value Bt of end-of-period
public debt then evolves according to a law of motion:
B^il + U.JBt^-PtSt (13)
where the real primary budget surplus is given by:
st = itYt-Gt-Z,t (14)
Here xt, the share of the national product that is collected by the govern-
ment as tax revenues in period t, is the key fiscal policy decision each
period; the real value of (lump-sum) government transfers C,t is treated as
exogenously given, as are government purchases Gt. (We introduce the
additional type of exogenously given fiscal needs to be able to analyze
the consequences of a purely fiscal disturbance, with no implications for
the real allocation of resources beyond those that follow from its effect
on the government budget.)
5. For discussion of how this is possible even in a cashless economy of the kind assumed
here, see Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
6. This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the nom-
inal interest rate is equal to f = (3"
1 - 1 > 0 under the optimal policy in the absence of dis-
turbances.278 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
Rational-expectations equilibrium requires that the expected path of
government surpluses must satisfy an intertemporal solvency condition:
(15)
T= t
in each state of the world that may be realized at date t, where RtT =
QtT PT/Pt is the stochastic discount factor for a real income stream.
7 This
condition restricts the possible paths that may be chosen for the tax rate
{xt}. Monetary policy can affect this constraint, however, both by affecting
the period t inflation rate (which affects the left side) and (in the case of
sticky prices) by affecting the discount factors {RtJ}.
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an
optimal policy commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths
{n,, Yt, xt, bt, AJ from some initial date t0 onward that satisfy equations (11),
(12), and (15) for each t > tQ, given initial government debt btQ_x and price
dispersion A^, to maximize equation (5). Such a f0-optimal plan requires
commitment, insofar as the corresponding f-optimal plan for some later
date t, given the conditions bt_v A,_L obtaining at that date, will not involve
a continuation of the £0-optimal plan. This failure of time consistency
occurs because the constraints on what can be achieved at date tQ, consis-
tent with the existence of a rational-expectations equilibrium, depend on
the expected paths of inflation, output, and taxes at later dates; but in the
absence of a prior commitment, a planner would have no motive at those
later dates to choose a policy consistent with the anticipations that it was
desirable to create at date t0.
However, the degree of advance commitment that is necessary to bring
about an optimal equilibrium is only of a limited sort. Let:
and let ^be the set of values for (bt_lf At_lf Ft, Kt, Wt) such that there exist paths {nT, YT, iT, bT, AT} for dates T > t that satisfy equations (11), (12), and (15) for each T, that are consistent with the specified values for Ft, Kt, and
Wt, and that imply a well-defined value for the objective Ut defined in
equation (5). Furthermore, for any (bt_v AM, Ft/ Kt, Wt) e 7
r, let V (bt_v AM, Xt; ^t) denote the maximum attainable value of Ut among the state-contingent
7. See Woodford (2003, Chapter 2) for the derivation of this condition from household opti-
mization together with market clearing. The condition should not be interpreted as an a
priori constraint on possible government policy rules, as discussed in Woodford (2001).
When we consider the problem of choosing an optimal plan from among the possible
rational-expectations equilibria, however, this condition must be imposed among the con-
straints on the set of equilibria that one may hope to bring about.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 279
paths that satisfy the constraints just mentioned, where Xt = (Ft, Kt, W,).
8
Then the f0-optimal plan can be obtained as the solution to a two-stage
optimization problem, as shown in the appendix (Section 7).
In the first stage, values of the endogenous variables xto, where xt = (Ilf,
Yt, xt, bt, Af), and state-contingent commitments XfQ +1 (£to + j) for the follow- ing period, are chosen, subject to a set of constraints stated in the appen-
dix, including the requirement that the choices (btQ, A,o, Xto + 1) 6 yfor each possible state of the world £>to+i- These variables are chosen to maximize the
objective/ [X,o, X(o + 1()](^,o), where we define the functional:
In the second stage, the equilibrium evolution from period t0 + 1
onward is chosen to solve the maximization problem that defines the
value function V(btg, At(j, Xfo+1; %to+1), given the state of the world ^o+1 and the precommitted values for Xto+1 associated with that state. The key to this
result is a demonstration that there are no restrictions on the evolution of
the economy from period to+l onward that are required for this expected
evolution to be consistent with the values chosen for xt(/ except consis-
tency with the commitments Xf +1 (£( +1) chosen in the first stage. The optimization problem in stage two of this reformulation of the
Ramsey problem is of the same form as the Ramsey problem itself, except
that there are additional constraints associated with the precommitted
values for the elements of XtQ+1 (^,0+i). Let us consider a problem like the
Ramsey problem just defined, looking forward from some period tQ,
except under the constraints that the quantities Xto must take certain given
values, where (&fo-i, \-\, XtQ) e y. This constrained problem can similarly
be expressed as a two-stage problem of the same form as above, with an
identical stage-two problem to the one described above. Stage two of this
constrained problem is thus of exactly the same form as the problem itself.
Hence, the constrained problem has a recursive form. It can be decom-
posed into an infinite sequence of problems, in which in each period t, (xt,
XM (•)) are chosen to maximize J [xt/ XM (•)] (£, t), subject to the constraints of the stage-one problem, given the predetermined state variables (bt_v AM)
and the precommitted values Xt.
Our aim here is to characterize policy that solves this constrained opti-
mization problem (stage two of the original Ramsey problem), i.e., policy
that is optimal from some date t onward given precommitted values for
8. In our notation for the value function V, ^, denotes not simply the vector of disturbances
in period t, but all information in period t about current and future disturbances. This cor-
responds to the disturbance vector "t,t referred to earlier in the case that the disturbance
vector follows a Markov process.280 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
Xt. Because of the recursive form of this problem, it is possible for a com-
mitment to a time-invariant policy rule from date t onward to implement
an equilibrium that solves the problem, for some specification of the ini-
tial commitments Xt. A time-invariant policy rule with this property is
said by Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) to be "optimal from a timeless per-
spective."
9 Such a rule is one that a policymaker who solves a traditional
Ramsey problem would be willing to commit to follow eventually, though
the solution to the Ramsey problem involves different behavior initially
because there is no need to internalize the effects of prior anticipation of
the policy adopted for period t0.
10 One might also argue that it is desirable
to commit to follow such a rule immediately, even though such a policy
would not solve the (unconstrained) Ramsey problem, as a way of
demonstrating one's willingness to accept constraints that one wishes the
public to believe that one will accept in the future.
2. A Linear-Quadratic Approximate Problem
In fact, we shall here characterize the solution to this problem (and simi-
larly derive optimal time-invariant policy rules) only for initial conditions
near certain steady-state values, allowing us to use local approximations
in characterizing optimal policy.
1
1 We establish that these steady-state val-
ues have the property that if one starts from initial conditions close
enough to the steady state, and exogenous disturbances thereafter are
small enough, the optimal policy subject to the initial commitments
remains forever near the steady state. Hence, our local characterization
would describe the long-run character of Ramsey policy, in the event that
disturbances are small enough, and that deterministic Ramsey policy
would converge to the steady state.
1
2 Of greater interest here, it describes
policy that is optimal from a timeless perspective in the event of small
disturbances.
9. See also Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
10. For example, in the case of positive initial nominal government debt, the i0-optimal pol-
icy would involve a large inflation in period tQ to reduce the pre-existing debt burden, but
a commitment not to respond similarly to the existence of nominal government debt in
later periods.
11. Local approximations of the same sort are often used in the literature in numerical char-
acterizations of Ramsey policy. Strictly speaking, however, such approximations are
valid only in the case of initial commitments Xtg near enough to the steady-state values
of these variables, and the f0-optimal (Ramsey) policy need not involve values of Xt near
the steady-state values, even in the absence of random disturbances.
12. Our work (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) gives an example of an application in which
Ramsey policy does converge asymptotically to the steady state, so that the solution to the
approximate problem approximates the response to small shocks under the Ramsey pol-
icy, at dates long enough after t0. We cannot make a similar claim in the present applica-
tion, however, because of the unit root in the dynamics associated with optimal policy.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 281
First, we must show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal
policy (under appropriate initial conditions) that involves constant values
of all variables. To this end, we consider the purely deterministic case, in
which the exogenous disturbances Q, Gt, Ht, At, \y™, C,t each take constant values C, G, H, A, \i
w > 0 and t, > 0 for all t> t0, and assume an initial real
public debt btQ_x = b > 0. We wish to find an initial degree of price disper-
sion At(rl and initial commitments XtQ = X so that the solution to the stage-
two problem defined above involves a constant policy xt = x, Xt+1 = X each
period, in which b is equal to the initial real debt and A is equal to the ini-
tial price dispersion. We show in the appendix (Section 7) that the first-
order conditions for this problem admit a steady-state solution of this
form, and we verify below that the second-order conditions for a local
optimum are also satisfied.
Regardless of the initial public debt b, we show that Yl= 1 (zero infla-
tion), and correspondingly that A = 1 (zero price dispersion). Note that
our conclusion that the optimal steady-state inflation rate is zero gen-
eralizes our result (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) for the case in which
taxes are lump-sum at the margin. We may furthermore assume with-
out loss of generality that the constant values of C and H are chosen
(given the initial government debt b) so that in the optimal steady state,
Ct = C and Ht = H each period.
1
3 The associated steady-state tax rate is
given by:
X = Sn + y
where Y=C + G>0is the steady-state output level, and sG = G/Y< 1 is the
steady-state share of output purchased by the government. As shown in
Section 7, this solution necessarily satisfies 0 < i < 1.
We next wish to characterize the optimal responses to small perturba-
tions of the initial conditions and small fluctuations in the disturbance
processes around the above values. To do this, we compute a linear-quad-
ratic approximate problem, the solution to which represents a linear
approximation to the solution to the stage-two policy problem, using the
method we introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003). An important
advantage of this approach is that it allows direct comparison of our
results with those obtained in other analyses of optimal monetary stabi-
lization policy. Other advantages are that it makes it straightforward to
verify whether the second-order conditions hold (the second-order condi-
tions that are required for a solution to our first-order conditions to be at
13. Note that we may assign arbitrary positive values to C, H without changing the nature
of the implied preferences as long as the value of X is appropriately adjusted.282 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
least a local optimum),
1
4 and that it provides us with a welfare measure
with which to rank alternative suboptimal policies, in addition to allow-
ing computation of the optimal policy.
We begin by computing a Taylor-series approximation to our welfare
measure in equation (5), expanding around the steady-state allocation
defined above, in which yt (i) = Yfor each good at all times and ^ = 0 at all
times.
1
5 As a second-order (logarithmic) approximation to this measure,
we obtain:
7 7 - Yil • F / R
f"
 fo <b\ — — u Y




where Yt = log(Yt/Y) and At = log A, measure deviations of aggregate out-
put and the price dispersion measure from their steady-state levels.
1
6 The
term t.i.p. collects terms that are independent of policy (constants and
functions of exogenous disturbances) and hence is irrelevant for ranking
alternative policies; || ^ || is a bound on the amplitude of our perturbations
of the steady state.
1
7 Here the coefficient:
measures the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor,
and hence the inefficiency of the steady-state output level Y. Under the
assumption that b > 0, we necessarily have O > 0, meaning that steady-
state output is inefficiently low. The coefficients uyy, u^, and uA are defined
in the appendix (Section 7).
14. We (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) show that these conditions can fail to hold, so that a
small amount of arbitrary randomization of policy is welfare-improving, but we argue
that the conditions under which this occurs in our model are not empiricallyj>lausible.
15. Here the elements of \t are assumed to be ct = log (G/C), h, = log (Ht/H), a, = log (A,/A), $ = \og(\if/p.
w), G, = (G, - G)/X and £, = (£, - Q/Y, so that a value of zero for this
vector corresponds to the steady-state values of all disturbances. The perturbations G,
and £f are not defined to be logarithmic so that we do not have to assume positive steady-
state values for these variables.
16. See the appendix (Section 7) for details. Our calculations here follow closely those of our
earlier work (Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6; Benigno and Woodford, 2003).
17. Specifically, we use the notation ^(H^l^) as shorthand for <^(||^, htg_v A,
1^, Xj*), where in
each case circumflexes refer to log deviations from the steady-state values of the various
parameters of the policy problem. We treat A^,
2 as an expansion parameter, rather than
A/(rl because equation (12) implies that deviations of the inflation rate from zero of order
e only result in deviations in the dispersion measure A, from one of order e
2. We are thus
entitled to treat the fluctuations in At as being only of second order in our bound on the
amplitude of disturbances because, if this is true at some initial date, it will remain true
thereafter.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 283
Under the Calvo assumption about the distribution of intervals
between price changes, we can relate the dispersion of prices to the over-





for a certain coefficient un > 0 defined in the appendix, where nt = log Ylt is
the inflation rate. Thus, we can write our stabilization objective purely in
terms of the evolution of the aggregate variables {% nt) and the exogenous
disturbances.
We note that when O > 0, there is a nonzero linear term in equation
(18), which means that we cannot expect to evaluate this expression to
second order using only an approximate solution for the path of aggre-
gate output that is accurate only to first order. Thus, we cannot deter-
mine optimal policy, even up to first order, using this approximate
objective together with approximations to the structural equations that
are accurate only to first order. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) avoid
this problem by assuming an output subsidy (i.e., a value T < 0) of the
size needed to ensure that <J> = 0. Here, we do not wish to make this
assumption because we assume that lump-sum taxes are unavailable, in
which case O = 0 would be possible only in the case of a particular ini-
tial level of government assets b < 0. Furthermore, we are more inter-
ested in the case in which government revenue needs are more acute
than that would imply.
We (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) propose an alternative way of
dealing with this problem; we use a second-order approximation to the
aggregate-supply relation to eliminate the linear terms in the quadratic
welfare measure. In the model that we consider, where taxes are lump-
sum (and so do not affect the aggregate supply relation), a forward-
integrated second-order approximation to this relation allows one to
express the expected discounted value of output terms OYt as a function
of purely quadratic terms (except for certain transitory terms that do
not affect the stage-two policy problem). In the present case, the level
of distorting taxes has a first-order effect on the aggregate-supply rela-
tion (see equation [22] below), so that the forward-integrated relation
involves the expected discounted value of the tax rate as well as the
expected discounted value of output. As shown in the appendix, how-
ever, a second-order approximation to the intertemporal solvency con-
dition in equation (15) provides another relation between the expected
discounted values of output and the tax rate and a set of purely quadratic284 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
terms.
1
8 These two second-order approximations to the structural equa-
tions that appear as constraints in our policy problem can then be used
to express the expected discounted value of output terms in equation
(18) in terms of purely quadratic terms.
In this manner, we can rewrite equation (18) as:
where again the coefficients are defined in the appendix (Section 7). The
expression tt indicates a function of the vector of exogenous disturbances
^ defined in the appendix, while Tto is a transitory component. When the
alternative policies from date t0 onward must be evaluated and must be
consistent with a vector of prior commitments XtQ/ one can show that the
value of the term Tt is implied (to a second-order approximation) by the
value of XtQ. Hence, for purposes of characterizing optimal policy from a
timeless perspective, it suffices that we rank policies according to the
value that they imply for the loss function:
\hy% q\ (20)
where a lower value of expression (20) implies a higher value of expression
(19). Because this loss function is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking linear
terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second order using only a first-order
approximation to the equilibrium evolution of inflation and output under
a given policy. Hence, log-linear approximations to the structural relations
of our model suffice, yielding a standard linear-quadratic policy problem.
For this linear-quadratic problem to have a bounded solution (which
then approximates the solution to the exact problem), we must verify that
the quadratic objective in equation (20) is convex. We show in the appen-
dix (Section 7) that qy, qK > 0, so that the objective is convex, as long as the
steady-state tax rate T and share of government purchases sG in the
national product are below certain positive bounds. We shall here assume
that these conditions are satisfied, i.e., that the government's fiscal needs
are not too severe. Note that, in this case, our quadratic objective turns out
to be of a form commonly assumed in the literature on monetary policy
evaluation; that is, policy should seek to minimize the discounted value
of a weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation from an optimal
18. Since we are interested in providing an approximate characterization of the stage-two
policy problem, in which a precommitted value of W, appears as a constraint, it is actu-
ally a second-order approximation to that constraint that we need. This latter constraint
has the same form as equation (15), however; the only difference is that the quantities in
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level (here, zero) and squared fluctuations in an output gap yt = Yt- Yt*,
where the target output level Y* depends on the various exogenous dis-
turbances in a way discussed in the appendix. It is also perhaps of inter-
est to note that a tax-smoothing objective of the kind postulated by Barro
(1979) and Bohn (1990) does not appear in our welfare measure as a sep-
arate objective. Instead, tax distortions are relevant only insofar as they
result in output gaps of the same sort that monetary stabilization policy
aims to minimize.
We turn next to the form of the log-linear constraints in the approxi-
mate policy problem. A first-order Taylor series expansion of equation (11)
around the zero-inflation steady state yields the log-linear aggregate-
supply relation:
nt = Kfr + yzt + c\ %t] + $Etnt+1 (21)
for certain coefficients K, \J/ > 0. This is the familiar new Keynesian Phillips
curve relation.
1
9 It is extended here to account for the effects of variations
in the level of distorting taxes on supply costs.
It is useful to write this approximate aggregate-supply relation in terms
of the welfare-relevant output gap yt. Equation (21) can be be written as:
nt = K[yt + \|/xt + ut] + $Etnt + 1 (22)
where ut is composite cost-push disturbance, indicating the degree to
which the various exogenous disturbances included in \t preclude simul-
taneous stabilization of inflation, the welfare-relevant output gap, and the
tax rate. Alternatively we can write:
nt = K\yt + \|/(Tt -%)] + p£t7it + 1 (23)
where if = - \|/ ~
lut indicates the tax change needed at any time to offset
the cost-push shock, thus to allow simultaneous stabilization of inflation
and the output gap (the two stabilization objectives reflected in equa-
tion [20]).
The effects of the various exogenous disturbances in t,t on the cost-push
term ut are explained in the appendix (Section 7). It is worth noting that
under certain conditions ut is unaffected by some disturbances. In the case
that O = 0, the cost-push term is given by:
ut = u^r (24)
where in this case, u^5 = q'
1 > 0. Thus, the cost-push term is affected only
by variations in the wage markup jif; it does not vary in response to
taste shocks, technology shocks, government purchases, or variations in
19. See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).286 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
government transfers. The reason is that when 0 = 0 and neither taxes nor
the wage markup vary from their steady-state values, the flexible-price
equilibrium is efficient; it follows that the level of output consistent with
zero inflation is also the one that maximizes welfare, as discussed in
Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
Even when O > 0, if there are no government purchases (so that sG = 0)
and no fiscal shocks (meaning that Ct = 0 and C,t = 0), then the ut term is
again of the form in equation (24), but with u^5 = (1 - O) q~y
lt, as we dis-
cussed in Benigno and Woodford (2003). Hence, in this case, neither taste
nor technology shocks have cost-push effects. The reason is that in this
isoelastic case, if taxes and the wage markup never vary, the flexible-
price equilibrium value of output and the efficient level vary in exactly
the same proportion in response to each of the other types of shocks;
hence, inflation stabilization also stabilizes the gap between actual out-
put and the efficient level. Another special case is the limiting case of lin-
ear utility of consumption (o "
l = 0); in this case, ut is again of the form in
equation (24) for a different value of u^5. In general, however, when O > 0
and sG > 0, all of the disturbances shift the flexible-price equilibrium level
of output (under a constant tax rate) and the efficient level of output to dif-
fering extents, resulting in cost-push contributions from all of these shocks.
The other constraint on possible equilibrium paths is the intertemporal
government solvency condition. A log-linear approximation to equation
(15) can be written in the form:
ht_x -nt- G^yt = - ft + (1 - P)£t Ep
r-'[&yyT + Mxr - xj)] (25)
where o > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private expen-
diture, and the coefficients by, bx are defined in the appendix, as is/,, a com-
posite measure of exogenous fiscal stress. Here, we have written the
solvency condition in terms of the same output gap and tax gap as equa-
tion (23) to make clear the extent to which complete stabilization of the
variables appearing in the loss function of equation (20) is possible. The
constraint can also be written in a flow form:
h — IT — *T 1 1/ -\- f = (1 — R^F/i 1/ -A- h (T — T W
u ^ — \ J\< f u }y t J t — V r / L y -/ t T \ t t ) \
+ $Et[ht - nt + l - <J~
lyt + l + /,+ 1], (26)
together with a transversality condition.
2
0
20. If we restrict attention to bounded paths for the endogenous variables, then a path satis-
fies equation (25) in each period t > tQ if and only if it satisfies the flow budget constraint
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We note that the only reason why it should not be possible to stabilize
both inflation and the output gap completely from some date t onward is
if the sum bt_t +ft is nonzero. The composite disturbance ft therefore com- pletely summarizes the information at date t about the exogenous distur-
bances that determines the degree to which stabilization of inflation and
output is not possible; under an optimal policy, the state-contingent evo-
lution of the inflation rate, the output gap, and the real public debt
depend solely on the evolution of the single composite disturbance
process \ft}.
This result contrasts with the standard literature on optimal monetary sta-
bilization policy, in which (in the absence of a motive for interest-rate stabi-
lization, as here) it is instead the cost-push term ut that summarizes the
extent to which exogenous disturbances require that fluctuations in inflation
and in the output gap should occur. Note that in the case when there are no
government purchases and no fiscal shocks, ut corresponds simply to equa-
tion (24). Thus, for example, it is concluded (in a model with lump-sum
taxes) that there should be no variation in inflation in response to a technol-
ogy shock (Khan et al, 2002; Benigno and Woodford, 2003). But even in this
simple case, the fiscal stress is given by an expression of the form:
(27)
where the expressions h'^ £,t and/£ \t both generally include nonzero coef-
ficients on preference and technology shocks, in addition to the markup
shock, as shown in the appendix. Hence, many disturbances that do not
have cost-push effects nonetheless result in optimal variations in both
inflation and the output gap.
Finally, we wish to consider optimal policy subject to the constraints
that Ffo, Kto and WtQ take given (pre-committed) values. Again, only log-
linear approximations to these constraints matter for a log-linear approx-
imate characterization of optimal policy. As discussed in the appendix,
the corresponding constraints in our approximate model are pre-commit-
ments regarding the state-contingent values of ntQ and ytQ.
To summarize, our approximate policy problem involves the choice of
state-contingent paths for the endogenous variables {nt, yt, xu bt) from some date t0 onward to minimize the quadratic loss function in equation
(20), subject to the constraint that the conditions in equations (23) and (25)
be satisfied each period, given an initial value btQ_lf and subject also to the
constraints that ntQ and ytQ equal certain pre-committed values (that may
depend on the state of the world in period tQ). We shall first characterize
the state-contingent evolution of the endogenous variables in response to
exogenous shocks, in the rational-expectations equilibrium that solves288 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
this problem. We then turn to the derivation of optimal policy rules, com-
mitment to which should implement an equilibrium of this kind.
3. Optimal Responses to Shocks: The Case of Flexible Prices
In considering the solution to the problem of stabilization policy just
posed, it may be useful first to consider the simple case in which prices
are fully flexible. This is the limiting case of our model in which a = 0,
with the consequence that qn = 0 in equation (20), and that K"
1 = 0 in
equation (23). Hence, our optimization problem reduces to the mini-
mization of:
jy0 '°y? (28)
subject to the constraints:
*) = 0 (29)
and equation (25). It is easy to see that in this case, the optimal policy is
one that achieves yt = 0 at all times. Because of equation (29), this requires
that T, = x* at all times. The inflation rate is then determined by the
requirement of government intertemporal solvency:
nt = frt-i + ft
This last equation implies that unexpected inflation must equal the inno-
vation in the fiscal stress:
Kt — tt_1Kt = ft — tt_1Jt
Expected inflation and hence the evolution of nominal government debt
are indeterminate. If we add to our assumed policy objective a small pref-
erence for inflation stabilization, when this has no cost in terms of other
objectives, then the optimal policy will be one that involves Et nt+l - 0 each
period.
2
1 Thus, the nominal public debt must evolve according to:
21. Note that this preference can be justified in terms of our model, in the case that a is pos-
itive though extremely small. Then there will be a very small positive value for qn, imply-
ing that reduction of the expected discounted value of inflation is preferred to the extent
that this does not require any increase in the expected discounted value of squared out-
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If, instead, we were to assume the existence of small monetary frictions
(and zero interest on money), the tie would be broken by the requirement
that the nominal interest rate equal zero each period.
2
2 The required
expected rate of inflation (and hence the required evolution of the nomi-
nal public debt) would then be determined by the variation in the equi-
librium real rate of return implied by a real allocation in which Yt = Yt
each period. That is, one would have Etnt+l = -rf, where r* is the (exoge-
nous) real rate of interest associated output at the target level each period,
and so:
bt = ~rt -Etft + 1
We thus obtain simple conclusions about the determinants of fluctuations
in inflation, output, and the tax rate under optimal policy. Unexpected
inflation variations occur as needed to prevent taxes from ever having to
be varied to respond to variations in fiscal stress, as in the analyses of
Bohn (1990) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). This allows a model with only
riskless nominal government debt to achieve the same state-contingent
allocation of resources as the government would choose to bring about if
it could issue state-contingent debt, as in the model of Lucas and Stokey
(1983).
Because taxes do not have to adjust in response to variations in fiscal
stress, as in the tax-smoothing model of Barro (1979), it is possible to
smooth them across states as well as over time. However, the sense in
which it is desirable to smooth tax rates is that of minimizing variation in
the gap Tt - x*, rather than variation in the tax rate itself.
2
3 In other words,
it is really the tax gap xt - f * that should be smoothed. Under certain spe-
cial circumstances, it will not be optimal for tax rates to vary in response
22. The result relies on the fact that the distortions created by the monetary frictions are min-
imized in the case of a zero opportunity cost of holding money each period, as argued by
Friedman (1969). Neither the existence of effects of nominal interest rates on supply costs
(so that an interest-rate term should appear in the aggregate-supply relation in equation
[29]) nor the contribution of seignorage revenues to the government budget constraint
make any difference to the result because unexpected changes in revenue needs can
always be costlessly obtained through unexpected inflation, while any desired shifts in
the aggregate-supply relation to offset cost-push shocks can be achieved by varying the
tax rate.
23. Several authors (e.g., Chari et al., 1991,1994; Hall and Krieger, 2000; Aiyagari et al, 2002)
have found that in calibrated flexible-price models with state-contingent government
debt, the optimal variation in labor tax rates is quite small. Our results indicate this as
well, in the case that real disturbances have only small cost-push effects, and we have
listed earlier various conditions under which this will be the case. But under some cir-
cumstances, optimal policy may involve substantial volatility of the tax rate and indeed
more volatility of the tax rate than of inflation. This would be the case if shocks have
large cost-push effects while having relatively little effect on fiscal stress.290 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
to shocks; these are the conditions, discussed above, under which shocks
have no cost-push effects, so that there is no change in x*. For example, if
there are no government purchases and there is no variation in the wage
markup, this will be the case. But more generally, all disturbances will
have some cost-push effect and will result in variations in x*. Then there
will be variations in the tax rate in response to these shocks under an opti-
mal policy. There will be no unit root in the tax rate, however, as in the
Barro (1979) model of optimal tax policy. Instead, as in the analysis of
Lucas and Stokey (1983), the optimal fluctuations in the tax rate will be
stationary and will have the same persistence properties as the real dis-
turbances (specifically, the persistence properties of the composite cost-
push shock).
Variations in fiscal stress will instead require changes in the tax rate, as
in the analysis of Barro (1979), if we suppose that the government issues
only riskless indexed debt rather than the riskless nominal debt assumed
in our baseline model. (Again, for simplicity we assume that only one-
period riskless debt is issued.) In this case the objective function in equa-
tion (20) and the constraints in equations (25) and (29) remain the same,
but bt_x = fy.! - nt, the real value of private claims on the government at the
beginning of period t, is now a predetermined variable. This means that
unexpected inflation variations can no longer relax the intertemporal gov-
ernment solvency condition. In fact, rewriting the constraint in equation
(25) in terms of bt_u we see that the path of inflation is now completely
irrelevant to welfare.
The solution to this optimization problem is now less trivial because
complete stabilization of the output gap is not generally possible. The
optimal state-contingent evolution of output and taxes can be determined
using a Lagrangian method, as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 7). The
Lagrangian for the present problem can be written as:
y( + bxxt) - ^{bt-G-'yt + 1)]} + <J<?2,t0-iyt0 (30)
where cplt, cp2f are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in
equations (29) and (26), respectively,
2
4 for each t > t0, and oq>2,t0 _x is the
notation used for the multiplier associated with the additional constraint
that ytQ = YtQ. The latter constraint is added to characterize optimal policy
from a timeless perspective, as discussed at the end of Section 2; the
24. Alternatively, cp2f is the multiplier associated with the constraint in equation (25).Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 291
particular notation used for the multiplier on this constraint results in a
time-invariant form for the first-order conditions, as seen below.
2
5 We
have dropped terms from the Lagrangian that are not functions of the
endogenous variables yt and %, i.e., products of multipliers and exoge-
nous disturbances, because these do not affect our calculation of the
implied first-order conditions.
The resulting first-order condition with respect to yt is:
- <Pit + [(1 - P)&y + tf'Mcpa - ff"
1^-! (31)
that with respect to x, is:
M«Pi* = (1 - P)^9a (32)
and that with respect to bt is:
92t = Ef92,t + i (33)
Each of these conditions must be satisfied for each t > t0, along with the
structural equations (29) and (25) for each t > t0, for given initial values b^^
and yt0. We look for a bounded solution to these equations so that (in the
event of small enough disturbances) none of the state variables leave a
neighborhood of the steady-state values, in which our local approxima-
tion to the equilibrium conditions and our welfare objective remain accu-
rate.
2
6 Given the existence of such a bounded solution, the transversality
condition is necessarily satisfied so that the solution to these first-order
conditions represents an optimal plan.
25. It should be recalled that, for policy to be optimal from a timeless perspective, the state-
contingent initial commitment yt0 must be chosen so it conforms to the state-contingent
commitment regarding y, that will be chosen in all later periods, so that the optimal pol-
icy can be implemented by a time-invariant rule. Hence, it is convenient to present the
first-order conditions in a time-invariant form.
26. In the only such solution, the variables xt, bt, and yt are all permanently affected by
shocks, even when the disturbances are all assumed to be stationary (and bounded)
processes. Hence, a bounded solution exists only under the assumption that random dis-
turbances occur only in a finite number of periods. However, our characterization of
optimal policy does not depend on a particular bound on the number of periods in which
there are disturbances, or which periods these are; to allow disturbances in a larger num-
ber of periods, we must assume a tighter bound on the amplitude of disturbances for the
optimal paths of the endogenous variables to remain within a given neighborhood of the
steady-state values. Aiyagari et al. (2002) discuss the asymptotic behavior of the optimal
plan in the exact nonlinear version of a problem similar to this one, in the case that dis-
turbances occur indefinitely.292 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
An analytical solution to these equations is easily given. Using equation
(29) to substitute for \ in the forward-integrated version of equation (25),
then equations (31) and (32) to substitute for yt as a function of the path of
<p2f, and finally using equation (33) to replace all terms of the form Et cp2 f+/ (for j > 0) by (p2t, we obtain an equation that can be solved for (p2f. The solu-
tion is of the form:
_ mb l Xf
mb + nb
Coefficients mb, nb are defined in the appendix (Section 7). The implied
dynamics of the government debt are then given by:
This allows a complete solution for the evolution of government debt and
the multiplier, given the composite exogenous disturbance process {ft},
starting from initial conditions hto_1 and <p2lt0-i-
27 Given these solutions, the
optimal evolution of the output gap and tax rate are given by:
yt = m(?(?2t + n^2it_x
where rar n9 are again defined in the appendix (Section 7). The evolution
of inflation remains indeterminate. If we again assume a preference for
inflation stabilization when it is costless, optimal policy involves nt - 0 at
all times.
In this case, unlike that of nominal debt, inflation is not affected by a
pure fiscal shock (or indeed any other shock) under the optimal policy,
but instead the output gap and the tax rate are. Note also that in the above
solution, the multiplier cp2f/ the output gap, and the tax rate all follow unit
root processes: a temporary disturbance to the fiscal stress permanently
changes the level of each of these variables, as in the analysis of the opti-
mal dynamics of the tax rate in Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990). However,
the optimal evolution of the tax rate is not in general a pure random walk,
as in the analysis of Barro and Bohn. Instead, the tax gap is an IMA(1,1)
process, as in the local analysis of Aiyagari et al. (2002); the optimal tax
27. The initial condition for 92,io-i is chosen in turn so that the solution obtained is consistent
with the initial constraint y,o = y,o. Under policy that is optimal from a timeless perspec-
tive, this initial commitment is chosen in turn in a self-consistent fashion, as discussed
further in Section 5. Note that the specification of cp2,t0 -i does not affect our conclusions in
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rate xtt may have more complex dynamics, in the case that xf exhibits sta-
tionary fluctuations. In the special case of linear utility (a ~
l - 0), n^ = 0, and
both the output gap and the tax gap follow random walks (both co-move
with cp2f). If the only disturbances are fiscal disturbances (Q and t, t), then
there are also no fluctuations in xf in this case so that the optimal tax rate
follows a random walk.
More generally, we observe that optimal policy smooths cp2f,
 m
e value
(in units of marginal utility) of additional government revenue in period
t so that it follows a random walk. This is the proper generalization of
the Barro tax-smoothing result, although it implies smoothing of tax
rates in only fairly special cases. We find a similar result in the case that
prices are sticky, even when government debt is not indexed, as we now
show.
4. Optimal Responses to Shocks: The Case of Sticky Prices
We turn now to the characterization of the optimal responses to shocks in
the case that prices are sticky (a > 0). The optimization problem that pro-
vides a first-order characterization of optimal responses in this case is that
of choosing processes {nt, yt, xt, bt) from date tQ onward to minimize equa- tion (20), subject to the constraints in equations (23) and (25) for each
t > t0, together with initial constraints of the form:
given the initial condition bto-\ and the exogenous evolution of the com-
posite disturbances {zf,ft}. The Lagrangian for this problem can be writ-
ten as:
t = to
by analogy with equation (30).
The first-order condition with respect to nt is given by:
qnnt = K-
!((plf - cpu_!) + (<p2f " 92,t-i) (34)
that with respect to yt is given by:
qyVt = - <Pu + [(1 - P)&y + cr-
1]^ - o-'Vit-i (35)294 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
and that with respect to % is given by:
\j/(plf = (l-(3)bT(p2f (36)
and finally that with respect to bt is given by:
cp2( = Etcp21 +1 (37)
These together with the two structural equations and the initial condi-
tions are to be solved for the state-contingent paths of {nt, % iu bt, cplf/ 92f}. Note that the last three first-order conditions are the same as for the flex-
ible-price model with indexed debt; the first condition in equation (34)
replaces the previous requirement that nt = 0. Hence, the solution
obtained in the previous section corresponds to a limiting case of this
problem, in which qn is made unboundedly large; for this reason the dis-
cussion above of the more familiar case with flexible prices and riskless
indexed government debt also provides insight into the character of opti-
mal policy in the present case.
In the unique bounded solution to these equations, the dynamics of
government debt and of the shadow value of government revenue 92t are
again of the form:
™b 1 rr | fr i
T 2( -T, I M T 2, t — 1 ^r, x «. U' t — 11
bt = - EJt + 1 - nbq>2t
although the coefficient mb now differs from mb in a way also described in
the appendix (Section 7). The implied dynamics of inflation and the out-
put gap are then given by:
n, = -(0,(92,-(pa_j) (38)
Vt = ^(p92f + «q>92/t-l (39)
where m,, n, are defined as before, and co^, is defined in the appendix. The
optimal dynamics of the tax rate are those required to make these infla-
tion and output-gap dynamics consistent with the aggregate-supply rela-
tion in equation (23). Once again, the optimal dynamics of inflation, the
output gap, and the public debt depend only on the evolution of the fis-
cal stress variable {/J; the dynamics of the tax rate also depend on the evo-
lution of {%*}.
We now discuss the optimal response of the variables to a disturbance
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ment debt and the Lagrange multiplier imply that temporary distur-
bances in the level of fiscal stress cause a permanent change in the level of
both the Lagrange multiplier and the public debt. This then implies a
permanent change in the level of output, which in turn requires (because
inflation is stationary) a permanent change in the level of the tax rate.
Since inflation is proportional to the change in the Lagrange multiplier,
the price level moves in proportion to the multiplier, which means a tem-
porary disturbance to the fiscal stress results in a permanent change in the
price level, as in the flexible-price case analyzed in the previous section.
Thus, in this case, the price level, output gap, government debt, and tax
rate all have unit roots, combining features of the two special cases con-
sidered in the previous section.
2
8 Both price level and cp2t
 ar
e random
walks. They jump immediately to a new permanent level in response to a
change in fiscal stress. In the case of purely transitory (white noise) dis-
turbances, government debt also jumps immediately to a new permanent
level. Given the dynamics of the price level and government debt, the
dynamics of output and tax rate then are jointly determined by the aggre-
gate-supply relation and the government budget constraint.
We also find that the degree to which fiscal stress is relieved by a price-
level jump (as in the flexible-price, nominal-debt case) as opposed to an
increase in government debt and hence a permanently higher tax rate (as
in the flexible-price, indexed-debt case) depends on the degree of price
stickiness. We illustrate this with a numerical example. We calibrate
a quarterly model by assuming that P = 0.99, co = 0.473, a"
1 = 0.157, and
K = 0.0236, in accordance with the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). We also assume an elasticity of substitution among alternative
goods of 9 = 10, an overall level of steady-state distortions O = %, a
steady-state tax rate of x = 0.2, and a steady-state debt level b/Y= 2.4 (debt
equal to 60% of a year's grass domestic product (GDP). Given the
assumed degree of market power of producers (a steady-state gross price
markup of 1.11) and the assumed size of the tax wedge, the value O =
 lA
corresponds to a steady-state wage markup of \f = 1.08. If we assume
that there are no government transfers in the steady state, then the
assumed level of tax revenues net of debt service would finance steady-
state government purchases equal to a share sG = 0.176 of output.
Let us suppose that the economy is disturbed by an exogenous increase in
transfer programs £,, equal to 1% of aggregate output, and expected to last
only for the current quarter. Figure 1 shows the optimal impulse response of
the government debt b to this shock (where quarter zero is the quarter of the
28. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) similarly observe that in a model with sticky prices, the
optimal response of the tax rate is similar to what would be optimal in a flexible-price
model with riskless indexed government debt.296 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
Figure 1 IMPULSE RESPONSE OF THE PUBLIC DEBT TO A PURE FISCAL
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6
shock), for each of 7 different values for K, the slope of the short-run aggre-
gate-supply relation, maintaining the values just stated for the other param-
eters of the model. The solid line indicates the optimal response in the case
of our baseline value for K, based on the estimates of Rotemberg and
Woodford; the other cases represent progressively greater degrees of price
flexibility, up to the limiting case of fully flexible prices (the case K = °°).
Figures 2 and 3 also show the optimal responses of the tax rate and the infla-
tion rate to the same disturbance, for each of the same seven cases.
2
9
We see that the volatility of both inflation and tax rates under optimal
policy depends greatly on the degree of stickiness of prices. Table 1
reports the initial quarter's response of the inflation rate, and the long-run
response of the tax rate, for each of the seven cases. The table also indi-
29. In Figure 1, a response of 1 means a 1% increase in the value of bt, from 60% to 60.6% of
a year's GDP. In Figure 2, a response of 1 means a 1% decrease in x,, from 20% to 20.2%.
In Figure 3, a response of 1 means a 1% per annum increase in the inflation rate, or an
increase of the price level from 1 to 1.0025 over the course of a quarter (given that our
model is quarterly). The responses reported in Table 1 are measured in the same way.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 297
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cates for each case the implied average time (in weeks) between price
changes, T = (- log a)"
1, where 0 < a < 1 is the fraction of prices unchanged
for an entire quarter implied by the assumed value of K.
3
0 We first note
that our baseline calibration implies that price changes occur only slightly
less frequently than twice per year, which is consistent with survey evi-
dence.
3
1 Next, we observe that even were we to assume an aggregate-sup-
ply relation several times as steep as the one estimated using U.S. data,
our conclusions with regard to the size of the optimal responses of the
(long-run) tax rate and the inflation rate would be fairly similar. At the
same time, the optimal responses with fully flexible prices are quite different:
30. We have used the relation between a and T for a continuous-time version of the Calvo
model to express the degree of price stickiness in terms of an average time between price
changes.
31. The indicated average time between price changes for the baseline case is shorter than
that reported in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), both because here we assume a slightly
larger value of 8, implying a smaller value of a, and because of the continuous-time
method used here to convert a into an implied average time interval.298 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
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the response of inflation is 80 times as large as under the baseline sticky-
price calibration (implying a variance of inflation 6400 times as large),
while the long-run tax rate does not respond at all in the flexible-price
case.
3
2 But even a small degree of stickiness of prices makes a dramatic
difference in the optimal responses; for example, if prices are revised only
every five weeks on average, the variance of inflation is reduced by a
factor of more than 200, while the optimal response of the long-run tax
rate to the increased revenue need is nearly the same size as under the
baseline degree of price stickiness. Thus, we find, as do Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2001) in the context of a calibrated model with convex costs of
price adjustment, that the conclusions of the flexible-price analysis are
32. The tax rate does respond in the quarter of the shock in the case of flexible prices, but
with the opposite sign to that associated with optimal policy under our baseline calibra-
tion. Under flexible prices, as discussed above, the tax rate does not respond to variations
in fiscal stress at all. Because the increase in government transfers raises the optimal level
of output Yo*, for reasons explained in the appendix (Section 7), the optimal tax rate x0
actually falls to induce equilibrium output to increase; under flexible prices, this is the
optimal response of x0.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 299
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quite misleading if prices are even slightly sticky. Under a realistic cali-
bration of the degree of price stickiness, inflation should be quite stable,
even in response to disturbances with substantial consequences for the
government's budget constraint, while tax rates should instead respond
substantially (and with a unit root) to variations in fiscal stress.
We can also compare our results with those that arise when taxes are
lump-sum. In this case, \|/ = 0, and the first-order condition in equation
(36) requires that (p2t = 0- The remaining first-order conditions reduce to:
for each t > t0, as in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 7). In
this case the fiscal stress is no longer relevant for inflation or output-gap
determination. Instead, only the cost-push shock ut is responsible for
incomplete stabilization. The determinants of the cost-push effects of
underlying disturbances and of the target output level Yf are also some-
what different because in this case fy = 0. For example, a pure fiscal shock
has no cost-push effect nor any effect on Yf, and hence no effect on the
optimal evolution of either inflation or output.
3
3 Furthermore, as shown in
the references just mentioned, the price level no longer follows a random
walk; instead, it is a stationary variable. Increases in the price level due to
a cost-push shock are subsequently undone by a period of deflation.
Note that the familiar case from the literature on monetary stabilization
policy does not result simply from assuming that sources of revenue that do
not shift the aggregate-supply (AS) relation are available; it is also important
that the sort of tax that does shift the AS relation (like the sales tax here) is not
available. We could nest both the standard model and our present baseline
case within a single, more general framework by assuming that revenue can
33. See our work (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) for a detailed analysis of the determinants
of w, and Yt in this case.300 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
be raised using either the sales tax or a lump-sum tax, but that there is an
additional convex cost (perhaps representing collection costs, assumed to
reduce the utility of the representative household but not using real
resources) of increases in either tax rate. The standard case would then
appear as the limiting case of this model in which the collection costs asso-
ciated with the sales tax are infinite, while those associated with the lump-
sum tax are zero; the baseline model here would correspond to an
alternative limiting case in which the collection costs associated with the
lump-sum tax are infinite, while those associated with the sales tax are zero.
In intermediate cases, we would continue to find that fiscal stress affects the
optimal evolution of both inflation and the output gap, as long as there is a
positive collection cost for the lump-sum tax. At the same time, the result
that the shadow value of additional government revenue follows a random
walk under optimal policy (which would still be true) will not in general
imply, as it does here, that the price level should also be a random walk; the
perfect co-movement of cplf and cp2f that characterizes optimal policy in our
baseline case will not be implied by the first-order conditions except in the
case that there are no collection costs associated with the sales tax.
Nonetheless, the price level will generally contain a unit root under optimal
policy, even if it will not generally follow a random walk.
We also obtain results more similar to those in the standard literature on
monetary stabilization policy if we assume (realistically) that it is not possi-
ble to adjust tax rates on such short notice in response to shocks as can be
done with monetary policy. As a simple way of introducing delays in the
adjustment of tax policy, suppose that the tax rate xf has to be fixed in period
t — d. In this case, the first-order conditions characterizing optimal responses
to shocks are the same as above, except that equation (36) is replaced by:
VEt<Vi,t + d = (1 " $)bxEtyzt + d (40)
for each t > t0. In this case, the first-order conditions imply that Etnt+ d + i =
0, but they no longer imply that changes in the price level cannot be fore-
casted from one period to the next. As a result, price-level increases in
response to disturbances are typically partially, but not completely,
undone in subsequent periods. Yet there continues to be a unit root in the
price level (of at least a small innovation variance), even in the case of an
arbitrarily long delay d in the adjustment of tax rates.
5. Optimal Targeting Rules for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now wish to characterize the policy rules that the monetary and fiscal
authorities can follow to bring about the state-contingent responses toOptimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 301
shocks described in the previous section. One might think that it suffices to
solve for the optimal state-contingent paths for the policy instruments, but
in general this is not a desirable approach to the specification of a policy
rule, as discussed in Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 7).
A description of optimal policy in these terms would require enumeration
of all of the types of shocks that might be encountered later, indefinitely far
in the future, which is not feasible in practice. A commitment to a state-con-
tingent instrument path, even when possible, also may not determine the
optimal equilibrium as the locally unique rational-expectations equilibrium
consistent with this policy; many other (much less desirable) equilibria may
also be consistent with the same state-contingent instrument path.
Instead, we here specify targeting rules in the sense of Svensson (1999,
2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003). These targeting rules are com-
mitments on the part of the policy authorities to adjust their respective
instruments so as to ensure that the projected paths of the endogenous vari-
ables satisfy certain target criteria. We show that under an appropriate
choice of these target criteria, a commitment to ensure that they hold at all
times will determine a unique nonexplosive rational-expectations equilib-
rium in which the state-contingent evolution of inflation, output, and the
tax rate solves the optimization problem discussed in the previous section.
We also show that it is possible to obtain a specification of the policy rules
that is robust to alternative specifications of the exogenous shock processes.
We apply the general approach of Giannoni and Woodford (2002), which
allows the derivation of optimal target criteria with the properties just
stated. In addition, Giannoni and Woodford show that such target criteria
can be formulated that refer only to the projected paths of the target vari-
ables (the ones in terms of which the stabilization objectives of policy are
defined—here, inflation and the output gap). Briefly, the method involves
constructing the target criteria by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers
from the system of first-order conditions that characterize the optimal
state-contingent evolution, regardless of character of the (additive) distur-
bances. We are left with linear relations among the target variables that do
not involve the disturbances and with coefficients independent of the spec-
ification of the disturbances that represent the desired target criteria.
Recall that the first-order conditions that characterize the optimal state-
contingent paths in the problem considered in the previous section are
given by subtracting equation (37) from equation (34). As explained in the
previous section, the first three of these conditions imply that the evolu-
tion of inflation and of the output gap must satisfy the subtraction of
equation (39) from equation (38) each period. We can solve this subtrac-
tion for the values of (p2f, (p2/H implied by the values of 7Ct, yt that are observed in an optimal equilibrium. We can then replace (p2,t-i
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relations by the multiplier implied in this way by observed values of nt_v
yt_v Finally, we can eliminate (p2t from these two relations to obtain a nec-
essary relation between nt and yt, given nt_x and yt_v given by:
JC( +^nt-i + |£(!/t-y,-i) = 0 (41)
This target criterion has the form of a flexible inflation target, similar
to the optimal target criterion for monetary policy in the model with
lump-sum taxation (Woodford, 2003, Chapter 7). It is interesting to note
that, as in all of the examples of optimal target criteria for monetary pol-
icy derived under varying assumptions in Giannoni and Woodford
(2003), it is only the projected rate of change of the output gap that mat-
ters for determining the appropriate adjustment of the near-term inflation
target; the absolute level of the output gap is irrelevant.
The remaining first-order condition from the previous section, not used
in the derivation of equation (41), is equation (37). By similarly using the
solutions for (p2/f+i/ 9a implied by observations of 7i(+1, yM to substitute for
the multipliers in this condition, one obtains a further target criterion:
Etnt + 1 = 0 (42)
(The fact that this always holds in the optimal equilibrium—i.e., that the
price level must follow a random walk—has already been noted in the
previous section.) We show in the appendix that policies ensuring that
the subtraction of equation (42) from equation (41) hold for all t > t0 deter-
mine a unique nonexplosive rational-expectations equilibrium.
This equilibrium solves the above first-order conditions for a particular
specification of the initial lagged multipliers tyi,to-i> <P2,to-i/ which are inferred







t explained. Hence, this equi-
librium minimizes expected discounted losses from equation (20) given ^
and subject to constraints on initial outcomes of the form:
7if0 = n{nh-i,yh-i) (43)
yto = y(Kto-i,yto-i) (44)
Furthermore, these constraints are self-consistent in the sense that the
equilibrium that solves this problem is one in which nt, yt are chosen to
satisfy equations of this form in all periods t > t0. Hence, these time-invari-
ant policy rules are optimal from a timeless perspective.
3
4 And they are
optimal regardless of the specification of disturbance processes. Thus, we
have obtained robustly optimal target criteria, as desired.
34. See Woodford (2003, Chapters 7 and 8) for additional discussion of the self-consistency
condition that the initial constraints are required to satisfy.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 303
We have established a pair of target criteria with the property that if
they are expected to be jointly satisfied each period, the resulting equilib-
rium involves the optimal responses to shocks. This result in itself, how-
ever, does not establish which policy instrument should be used to ensure
satisfaction of which criterion. Because the variables referred to in both
criteria can be affected by both monetary and fiscal policy, there is no
uniquely appropriate answer to that question. However, the following
represents a relatively simple example of a way in which such a regime
could be institutionalized through separate targeting procedures on the
part of monetary and fiscal authorities.
Let the central bank be assigned the task of maximizing social welfare
through its adjustment of the level of short-term interest rates, taking as
given the state-contingent evolution of the public debt {bt}, which depends
on the decisions of the fiscal authority. Thus, the central bank treats the
evolution of the public debt as being outside its control, just like the
exogenous disturbances {^J, and simply seeks to forecast its evolution to
model correctly the constraints on its own policy. Here, we do not propose
a regime under which it is actually true that the evolution of the public
debt would be unaffected by a change in monetary policy. But there is no
inconsistency in the central bank's assumption (because a given bounded
process {bt} will continue to represent a feasible fiscal policy regardless of
the policy adopted by the central bank), and we shall show that the con-
duct of policy under this assumption does not lead to a suboptimal out-
come as long as the state-contingent evolution of the public debt is
correctly forecasted by the central bank.
The central bank then seeks to bring about paths for {izt, yt, f,} from date
t0 onward that minimize equation (20), subject to the constraints in equa-
tions (23) and (25) for each t > t0, together with initial constraints of the
form equation (44) to equation (43), given the evolution of the processes
{fj*, /„ frj. The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are
given by equations (34), (35), and (37) each period, which in turn imply
that equation (41) must hold each period, as shown above. One can fur-
ther show that a commitment by the central bank to ensure that equation
(41) holds each period determines the equilibrium evolution that solves
this problem, in the case of an appropriate (self-consistent) choice of the
initial constraints (43) to (44). Thus equation (41) is an optimal target cri-
terion for a policy authority seeking to solve the kind of problem just
posed, and since the problem takes as given the evolution of the public
debt, it is obviously a more suitable assignment for the central bank than
for the fiscal authority. The kind of interest-rate reaction function that can
be used to implement a flexible inflation target of this kind is discussed in
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 7).304 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
Correspondingly, let the fiscal authority be assigned the task of choos-
ing the level of government revenue each period that will maximize
social welfare, taking as given the state-contingent evolution of output
{yt\, which it regards as being determined by monetary policy. (Again, it
need not really be the case that the central bank ensures a particular
state-contingent path of output, regardless of what the fiscal authority
does. But again, this assumption is not inconsistent with our model of the
economy because it is possible for the central bank to bring about any
bounded process {yt} that it wishes, regardless of fiscal policy, in the case
that prices are sticky.) If the fiscal authority regards the evolution of out-
put as outside its control, its objective reduces to the minimization of:
-
t0:i? (45)
But this is a possible objective for fiscal policy, given the effects of tax pol-
icy on inflation dynamics (when taxes are not lump-sum) indicated by
equation (23).
Forward integration of equation (23) implies that:
nt = xEt 5>-'yT + w|«EtZP
T-
t(XT - x?) (46)
r = t
Thus, what matters about fiscal policy for current inflation determination
is the present value of expected tax rates, but this in turn is constrained by
the intertemporal solvency condition in equation (25). Using equation (25)
to substitute for the present value of taxes in equation (46), we obtain a
relation of the form:
7if = ^fo.j - O~'yt + ft] + li2EtJ>-'yT (47) T= t
for certain coefficients \iv \x2 > 0 defined in the appendix. If the fiscal
authority takes the evolution of output as given, then this relation
implies that its policy in period t can have no effect on nt. However, it can
affect inflation in the following period through the effects of the current
budget on bt (implied by (27)), which then affects 7it+1 (according to (47)).
Furthermore, because the choice of bt has no effect on inflation in later
periods (given that it places no constraint on the level of public debt that
may be chosen in later periods), bt should be chosen to minimize Etn
2t+1.
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of bt is then simply
equation (42), which we find is indeed a suitable target criterion for the
fiscal authority. The decision rule implied by this target criterion is:
2.
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which expresses the optimal level of government borrowing as a function
of the fiscal authority's projections of the exogenous determinants of fis-
cal stress and of future real activity. It is clearly possible for the fiscal
authority to implement this target criterion and doing so leads to a deter-
minate equilibrium path for inflation, given the path of output. We thus
obtain a pair of targeting rules, one for the central bank and one for the
fiscal authority, that if both pursued will implement an equilibrium that is
optimal from a timeless perspective. Furthermore, each individual rule
can be rationalized as a solution to a constrained optimization problem
that the particular policy authority is assigned to solve.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to analyze optimal monetary and fiscal
policy jointly within a single framework. The two problems, often consid-
ered in isolation, turn out to be more closely related than might have been
expected. In particular, we find that variations in the level of distorting
taxes should be chosen to serve the same objectives as those emphasized
in the literature on monetary stabilization policy: stabilization of inflation
and of a (properly defined) output gap. A single output gap can be defined
that measures the total distortion of the level of economic activity, result-
ing both from the stickiness of prices (and the consequent variation in
markups) and from the supply-side effects of tax distortions. This cumula-
tive gap is what one wishes to stabilize, rather than the individual compo-
nents resulting from the two sources; and both monetary policy and tax
policy can be used to affect it. Both monetary policy and tax policy also
matter for inflation determination in our model because of the effects of
the tax rate on real marginal cost and hence on the aggregate-supply rela-
tion. Indeed, we have exhibited a pair of robustly optimal targeting rules
for the monetary and fiscal authorities, respectively, under which both
authorities consider the consequences of their actions for near-term infla-
tion projections in determining how to adjust their instruments.
And not only should the fiscal authority use tax policy to serve the tra-
ditional goals of monetary stabilization policy; we also find that the mon-
etary authority should take account of the consequences of its actions for
the government budget. In the present model, which abstracts entirely
from transactions frictions, these consequences have solely to do with the
implications of alternative price-level and interest-rate paths for the real
burden of interest payments on the public debt and not with any contri-
bution of seignorage to government revenues. Nonetheless, under a cal-
ibration of our model that assumes a debt burden and a level of
distorting taxes that would not be unusual for an advanced industrial306 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
economy, taking account of the existence of a positive shadow value of
additional government revenue (owing to the nonexistence of lump-sum
taxes) makes a material difference for the quantitative characterization of
optimal monetary policy. In fact, we have found that the crucial sum-
mary statistic that indicates the degree to which various types of real dis-
turbances should be allowed to affect short-run projections for either
inflation or the output gap is not the degree to which these disturbances
shift the aggregate-supply curve for a given tax rate (i.e., the extent to
which they represent cost-push shocks), but rather the degree to which
they create fiscal stress (shift the intertemporal government solvency
condition).
Our conclusion that monetary policy should account for the require-
ments for government solvency does not imply anything as strong as the
result of Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a flexible-price economy with nomi-
nal government debt, according to which surprise variations in the infla-
tion rate should be used to offset variations in fiscal stress completely so
that tax rates need not vary (other than as necessary to stabilize the out-
put gap). We find that in the case of even a modest degree of price sticki-
ness—much less than what seems to be consistent with empirical
evidence for the United States—it is not optimal for inflation to respond
to variations in fiscal stress by more than a tiny fraction of the amount that
would be required to eliminate the fiscal stress (and that would be opti-
mal with fully flexible prices); instead, a substantial part of the adjustment
should come through a change in the tax rate. But the way in which the
acceptable short-run inflation projection should be affected by variations
in the projected output gap is substantially different in an economy with
only distorting taxes than would be the case in the presence of lump-sum
taxation. With distorting taxes, the available trade-off between variations
in inflation and in the output gap depends not only on the way these vari-
ables are related to one another through the aggregate-supply relation but
also on the way that each of them affects the government budget.
7. Appendix
7.1 DERIVATION OF THE AGGREGATE-SUPPLY RELATION
(EQUATION (11))
In this section, we derive equation (11) and we define the variables Ft and
Kt. In the Calvo model, a supplier that changes its price in period t chooses
a new price pt(i) to maximize:
Et-
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where a
T
 t is the probability that the price set at time t remains fixed in
period T, QtJ is the stochastic discount factor given by equation (7) and





Here Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition implies that the individual
supplier faces a demand curve each period of the form:
yt(i) = Yf(pf(0/Pt)-
e
so that after-tax sales revenues are the function of p given in the first term
on the right side of equation (48). The second term indicates the nominal
wage bill, obtained by inverting the production function to obtain the
required labor input, and multiplying this by the industry wage for sec-
tor /. The industry wage is obtained from the labor supply equation (8),
under the assumption that each of the firms in industry j (other than i,
assumed to have a negligible effect on industry labor demand) charges
the common price pK (Because all firms in a given industry are assumed
to adjust their prices at the same time, in equilibrium the prices of firms
in a given industry are always identical. We must nonetheless define the
profit function for the case in which firm i deviates from the industry
price so we can determine whether the industry price is optimal for each
individual firm.)
We note that supplier i's profits are a concave function of the quantity
sold yt(i) because revenues are proportional to yf "
 l)/
 e(z) and hence con-
cave in yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Because yt(i) is proportional to
pt(i)"
Q, the profit function is also concave in pt(i)~
e. The first-order condition
for the optimal choice of the price pt{i) is the same as the one with respect
to pt(i) "
e; hence, the first-order condition with respect to pt{i) is both nec-
essary and sufficient for an optimum.
For this first-order condition, we obtain:
EA = o
with
uc(YT-GT;?,T)-ATf'(f-\YT(p/PT)-°/AT)) V308 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
Using the definitions:
and noting that each firm in an industry will set the same price, so that
pt(i) = p/ = pf, the common price of all goods with prices revised at date t,
we can rewrite the above first-order condition as:
EA2 = 0
Substituting the equilibrium value for the discount factor, we finally
obtain:
E, = o (49)







Using the isoelastic functional forms given in previous sections, we obtain






and where in the function k(-), the vector of shocks has been extended to
include the shock \tf. Substitution of equation (50) into the law of motion
for the Dixit-Stiglitz price index:
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yields a short-run aggregate-supply relation between inflation and output
of the form in equation (11).
7.2 RECURSIVE FORMULATION OF THE POLICY PROBLEM
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an opti-
mal policy commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths {nt,




tTsT (58) ut-1 p
where:
for each t > t0, given initial government debt bt(rl and price dispersion
Atn_v to maximize:
±t'&) (60)
Here we note that the definition (3) of the index of price dispersion
implies the law of motion:




( ' + (l-a)| 1-(; j (61)
which can be written in the form in equation (57); this is the origin of that
constraint.
We now show that the ^-optimal plan (Ramsey problem) can be
obtained as the solution to a two-stage optimization problem. To this pur-
pose, let:
Wt =
and let ^be the set of values for (bt_v AM/ Ft, Kt, Wt) such that there exist paths {nr, YT, xT, bT, AT} for dates T > t that satisfy equations (56), (57), and (58), for each T, that are consistent with the specified values for Ft, Kt,
defined in equations (63) and (64), and Wf, and that imply a well-defined
value for the objective Ut defined in equation (60). Furthermore, for any
(bt_y At_y Ft, Kt, Wt) E 5^ let V(bt_lf At_v Xt; ^t) denote the maximum attainable
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value of Ut among the state-contingent paths that satisfy the constraints
just mentioned, where Xt = (Ft, Kt, Wf).
3
5 Among these constraints is the
requirement that:
Wt = ^UcWt-Gt&t) (62)
for equation (58) to be satisfied. Thus, a specified value for Wt implies a
restriction on the possible values of nt and Yt, given the predetermined
real debt bt_x and the exogenous disturbances.
The two-stage optimization problem is the following. In the first stage,
values of the endogenous variables xto, where xt = (Tlt, Yt, xt, bt, A,), and state-contingent commitments Xto+1 (^,0+1) for the following period, are
chosen to maximize an objective defined below. In the second stage, the
equilibrium evolution from period t0 + 1 onward is chosen to solve the
maximization problem that defines the value function V(bto, Ato, Xto+1; £to+1), given the state of the world ^to+1 and the precommitted values for Xto+1 associated with that state.
In defining the objective for the first stage of this equivalent formula-
tion of the Ramsey problem, it is useful to let Il(F, K) denote the value of
nt that solves equation (56) for given values of Ft and Kt, and to let s(x; Q
denote the real primary surplus st defined by equation (59) in the case of
given values of xt and t,t. We also define the functional relationships:
where/(Y; ^) and k(Y; ^) are defined in equations (53) and (54).
Then in the first stage, xtfj and Xt+ l(-) are chosen to maximize:
ooW (63)
over values of xto and X,o+1(-) such that:
1. n,o and Ato satisfy equation (57);
2. the values:
35. As stated previously, in our notation for the value function V, %t denotes not simply the
vector of disturbances in period t but all information in period t about current and future
disturbances.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 311
(64)
Q Q0 0 (65)
satisfy:
nt0 = n(Ft0/Kt0) (66)
3. the value:
WtQ = M*t0/X,0+!(•)]&„) (67)
satisfies equation (62) for t = t0; and
4. the choices (bt(j, A,o, Xfo+1) e 9" for each possible state of the world
These constraints imply that the objective J[xto, Xto+i(-)] (h,to) is well-
defined and that values (xtQ, Xfo+1(-)) are chosen for which the stage-two
problem will be well defined, whichever state of the world is realized in
period to + l. Furthermore, in the case of any stage-one choices consistent
with the above constraints, and any subsequent evolution consistent with
the constraints of the stage-two problem, equation (66) implies that equa-
tion (56) is satisfied in period t0, while equation (62) implies that equation
(58) is satisfied in period t0. Constraint 1 above implies that equation (57)
is also satisfied in period t0. Finally, the constraints of the stage-two prob-
lem imply that equations (56), (57) and (58) are satisfied in each period
t > t0 + 1; thus, the state-contingent evolution that solves the two-stage
problem is a rational-expectations equilibrium. Conversely, one can show
that any possible rational-expectations equilibrium satisfies all these
constraints.
One can then reformulate the Ramsey problem, replacing the set of
requirements for rational-expectations equilibrium by the stage-one con-
straints plus the stage-two constraints. Because no aspect of the evolution
from period t0 + 1 onward, other than the specification of Xfo+1(-), affects
the stage-one constraints, the optimization problem decomposes into the
two stages defined above, where the objective in equation (63) corre-
sponds to the maximization of Uto in the first stage.
The optimization problem in stage two of this reformulation of the
Ramsey problem is of the same form as the Ramsey problem itself, except
that there are additional constraints associated with the pre-committed
values for the elements of Xto+1 (^fo+1). Let us consider a problem like the
Ramsey problem just defined, looking forward from some period t0,312 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
except under the constraints that the quantities Xfo must take certain given
values, where (bt(rl, A, a, XtQ) <= y. This constrained problem can also be
expressed as a two-stage problem of the same form as above, with an
identical stage-two problem to the one described above. The stage-one
problem is also identical to stage one of the Ramsey problem, except that
now the plan chosen in stage one must be consistent with the given val-
ues Xf()/ so that the conditions in equations (64), (65), and (67) are now
added to the constraints on the possible choices of (xtQ, X,o+1(-)) in stage
one. [The stipulation that {bto_v Atg_v X,o) e ;7"implies that the constraint set remains non-empty despite these additional restrictions.]
Stage two of this constrained problem is thus of exactly the same form
as the problem itself. Hence, the constrained problem has a recursive
form. It can be decomposed into an infinite sequence of problems, in
which in each period t, (xt, X(+1(-)) is chosen to maximize J[xt, Xt+1(-)] (£t), given the predetermined state variables (bt_v AM) and the precommitted
values Xt, subject to the constraints that:
1. nt is given by equation (66), Yt is then given by equation (62), and At is
given by equation 57;
2. the pre-committed values Xt are fulfilled, i.e.:
= Ft (68)
= Kt (69)
W[z,,Xt + 1(-)]($t) = Wt (70)
and
3. the choices (bt, At, XM) e ^for each possible state of the world £,t+1.
Our aim in the paper is to provide a local characterization of policy that
solves this recursive optimization, in the event of small enough distur-
bances, and initial conditions (bfo-i, AtQ_u Xt) e :?"that are close enough to
consistency with the steady state characterized in the next part of this
appendix.
7.3 THE DETERMINISTIC STEADY STATE
Here we show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal policy
(under appropriate initial conditions) of the recursive policy problem just
defined that involves constant values of all variables. We now consider a
deterministic problem in which the exogenous disturbances Ct, Gt, Ht, At,
\ft, C,t each take constant values C, H, A, p/" > 0 and G, £ > 0 for all t > t0, andOptimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 313
we start from initial conditions bh_x = b > 0. (The value of b is arbitrary,
subject to an upper bound discussed below.) We wish to find an initial
degree of price dispersion Ato_i and initial commitments Xfo = X so that the
recursive (or stage-two) problem involves a constant policy xtQ = x, Xt+1 =
Xeach period, in which b is equal to the initial real debt and A is equal to
the initial price dispersion.
We thus consider the problem of maximizing:
) (71)
subject to the constraints:
Ktp(nty
i
 + ^w~v = Ft (72)
Ft = (l-xt)f(Yt) +apn?;1
1Ft + 1 (73)
Kt = k(Yt) + apn^
+w)Kf + 1 (74)
Wt = uc(Yt)(xtYt- G-Q +pWt + 1 (75)
= KC(Y, )*>,_! (76)
„ n , . , . - e (i + co) /(i - e)
A^cxA.^nJ^^ + a-a)?^) (77)
and given the specified initial conditions bto_h Af(rl, X(o, where we have defined:
we introduce Lagrange multipliers §lt through §7t corresponding to the
constraints in equations (72) through (77), respectively. We also introduce
multipliers dated t0 corresponding to the constraints implied by the initial
conditions Xto = X; the latter multipliers are normalized so that the first-
order conditions take the same form at date t0 as at all later dates. The
first-order conditions of the maximization problem are then the following.
The one with respect to Yt is:
Uy(Yt,At) - (l-Tf)/y(Yt)<|>a y ucc(Yt)(G + Q^ - ua(Yf)tt_1nr>a = 0 (78)
The one with respect to At is:
UA(Yt,Lt) + 4>«- a|3 n?<\
+
 w
) «|)M +1 = 0 (79)314 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
The one with respect to n( is:
1 + rnft / x((l + we)/(e -1))-1 , ^f(ny (
0(1 + 0)),., (1 + (06)/(6 - 1) (80)
(1a)P(
n) p(n)<|)=o
The one with respect to x, is:
<J)2f - ^ = 0 (81)
The one with respect to Ft is:
-(^lf + (t)2t-an?-
1(|)2/t_1 = 0 (82)
The one with respect to Kt is:
, N(l + (o9)/(9 - 1) on , ,




a)^t_l = 0 (83)
The one with respect to Wt is:
<>« — 04, f -1 + <t>5f = 0 (84)
And finally, the one with respect to bt is:
4>» = 0 (85)
We search for a solution to these first-order conditions in which nf = n,
A, = A, Yt = X xt = x, and bt = b at all times. A steady-state solution of this
kind also requires that the Lagrange multipliers take constant values. We
also conjecture the existence of a solution in which Yl = 1, as stated previ-
ously. Note that such a solution implies that A = 1, p(U) = 1, pJJT) =
- (0 - 1) oc/(l - a), and K= P. Using these substitutions, we find that (the
steady-state version of) each of the first-order conditions in equations (78)
to (85) is satisfied if the steady-state values satisfy:
<]>! = (l-oc)(t>2
03 = " 02
04 = 02
05 = 0Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 315
These equations can obviously be solved (uniquely) for the steady-state
multipliers given any value Y> 0.
Similarly, (the steady-state versions of) the constraints in equations (72)
to (77) are satisfied if:
(l-T)uc(Y-G) = -^-[^vy(Y) (86)
xY = G + £+(l + (3)fc (87)
W=uc(Y-G)b
Equations (86) and (87) provide two equations to solve for the steady-
state values Yand x. Under standard (Inada-type) boundary conditions on
preferences, equation (86) has a unique solution Yx(x) > Gfor each possi-
ble value of 0 < x < I.
3
6 This value is a decreasing function of x and
approaches Gas x approaches 1. We note that, at least in the case of all
small enough values of G, there exists a range of tax rates 0 < x: < x < ii <
1 over which Ya(x) > G /x.
3
7 Given our assumption that b > 0 and that Q C,
> 0, equation (87) is satisfied only by positive values of x; for each x > 0,
this equation has a unique solution Y2(x). We also note that the locus Yt(x)
is independent of the values of £ and b, while Y2(x) approaches G/x as £
and b approach zero. Fixing the value of G (at a value small enough for
the interval (xlr x2) to exist), we then observe that for any small enough
values of b > 0 and C, > 0, there exist values 0 < x < 1 at which Y2(x) < Y1 (x).
On the other hand, for all small enough values of x > 0, Y2(x) > Yx (x). Thus,
by continuity, there must exist a value 0 < x < 1 at which Yx (x) = Y2 (x).
3
8
This allows us to obtain a solution for 0 < x < 1 and Y > 0, in the case of
any small enough values of G, £ > 0 and b > 0. The remaining equations
can then be solved (uniquely) for K - P and for W.
36. There is plainly no possibility of positive supply of output by producers in the case that
x, > 1 in any period; hence, the steady state must involve f < 1.
37. This is true for any tax rate at which (1 - x) uc(G(x'
1 - 1)) exceeds (9/(6 - 1)) |T" vy (G /x).
Fixing any value 0 < x <_1, our Inada conditions imply that this inequality holds for all
small enough values of G. And if the inequality holds for some 0 < x < 1, then by conti-
nuity it must hold for an open interval of values of x.
38. In fact, there must exist at least two such solutions because the Inada conditions also
imply that Y2(x) > Yj (x) for all x close enough to 1. These multiple solutions correspond
to a Laffer curve result under which two distinct tax rates result in the same equilibrium
level of government revenues. We select the lower-tax, higher-output solution as the one
around which we compute our Taylor-series expansions; this is clearly the higher-utility
solution.316 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
We have thus verified that a constant solution to the first-order condi-
tions exists. With a method to be explained below, we check that this solu-
tion is indeed at least a local optimum. Note that, as asserted previously,
this deterministic steady state involves zero inflation and a steady-state
tax rate 0 < f < 1.
7.4 A SECOND-ORDER APPROXIMATION TO UTILITY (EQUATIONS [17]
AND [18])
We derive here equations (17) and (18), taking a second-order approxi-
mation to equation (60) following the treatment in Woodford (2003,
Chapter 6). We start by approximating the expected discounted value of
the utility of the representative household:
(88)
First, we note that:
where At is the measure of price dispersion defined previously. We can
then write equation (88) as:
'° u(Yf;£f)-z;(Y(;£f)Af (89) t= t0
The first term in equation (89) can be approximated using a second-
order Taylor expansion around the steady state defined in the previous
section as:
u(Yt;£,t) =u + ucYt + u£t + \uccY? + uc^
)
Y + \V) + *& + Y
= YucYt + \\Yuc + Y*ucc]Y? - Y*uccgtYt + tip. +
- Yuc\?t + 1(1 - a-*)Y,
2 + cr-
1^^} + tip. + ^(ll^ll
3) (90)Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 317
where a bar denotes the steady-state value for each variable, a tilde
denotes the deviation of the variable from its steady-state value (e.g., Yt =
Yt-Y), and a circumflex refers to the log deviation of the variable from
its steady-state value (e.g., Yt = In YJY). We use ^ to refer to the entire vec-
tor of exogenous shocks:
4't = K, Gt gt qttf\
in which £ t = & - C )/*/ d = (Gt - G)/Y, & = _Q + sc ct, cog, = v ht + 0 (1 + v) flf, JV" s In jir/A




l with sc = C/Y and sc + sG = 1. We have used
the Taylor expansion:
to get a relation for Yt in terms of X- Finally the term t.i.p. denotes terms
that are independent of policy and may accordingly be suppressed as far
as the welfare ranking of alternative policies is concerned.
We may similarly approximate v(Yt; £f) At by:
v(Yt;Z,t)At = v + v{&t-\) + vy(Yt - Y) + vy(At - 1)(Y( - Y) + (A, -
+ \vyy{Yt - Y)
2 + (Y( - Y)vy£t + dm
5)
= v(At - 1) + vyY(Yt + \Y^ + vy(At - l)YYt + (At - l
\? + YYtvy^t + tip. + c><\\$ II
3)
% + \{l + co)Yf
2 + (At-l)Yt-<t>Ytqt
We take a second-order expansion of equation (61) to obtain:
2
A, = aAt-i + 1^9(1 + co) (1 + coG) \ + tip. + ^(ll^ll
3) (91)
This in turn allows us to approximate v(Yt; ^t) At as:
1(1 + co)Y
2 + Yt + 1(1 + co)Yf
2 - coY,
tip. + ^(||^ ||
3) (92)318 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
where we have used the steady state relation vy = (1 - O) uc to replace vy
by (1 - O) uc, and where:
measures the inefficiency of steady-state output Y.
Combining equations (90) and (92), we finally obtain equation (17):
o o - \uyyY? + Ytu& - uAAt]




We finally observe that equation (91) can be integrated to obtain:
+ tip + c> §
(94)
By substituting equation (94) into equation (93), we obtain:
Ut0 = YucEot = t0
+ tlp. + oiWl ||
3)
This coincides with equation (18), where we have further defined:
"TC -
7.5 A SECOND-ORDER APPROXIMATION TO THE AGGREGATE SUPPLY
EQUATION (EQUATION [11])
We now compute a second-order approximation to the aggregate supply
(AS) equation (56), or equation (11). We start from equation (50), which
can be written as:
1/(1 + coG)Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 319
where pt = p?/Pt- As we have shown (Benigno and Woodford, 2003), a sec-
ond-order expansion of this can be expressed in the form:
(1 + co8) . _ Q (1 + 0)9) r ,a b l -ccB) ^ ~
 zt
 +
 aP n -a
+ s.o.t.i.p.+ ^(||^||3) (95)
where we define:
Pf,T = log(Pt/PT)
and in this last expression:
XT = (2 + co)YT - o^T + |1^ + ST - a-\CT - cT)
where St = In (1 - x,)/(l - x). Here, s.o.t.i.p. refers to second-order (or
higher) terms independent of policy; the first-order terms have been kept
because these will matter for the log-linear aggregate-supply relation that
appears as a constraint in our policy problem.
We next take a second-order expansion of the law of motion in equation
(55) for the price index, obtaining:
where we have used the fact that:
and Pf_x f = -nt. We can then plug equation (96) into equation (95) to obtain:
1-9 1 ff2, K ~ , nr rr 1-0
2 (l-a)
Kf
(97)320 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
We note that a second-order approximation to the identity Ct = Yt- Gt
yields:










where coT = x / (1 - x). By substituting equations (98) and (99) into the def-
inition of zt in equation (97), we finally obtain a quadratic approximation
to the AS relation.
This can be expressed compactly in the following form:
Vt = K(C; xt + c'fit + \ x\ Cxxt + x'tC£t + \cnn
2t)
+ s.o.tlp. + o (||^ ||
3)
where we have defined:
xf =
(100)
,' = [0 0 -CT-









Vt = nt + -~vnKt + vzntZt
Zt = z'x x, + znnt + z( 4, + ap£( Z, +!
in which the coefficients:
0 0











4 = [0 0 <J-\l-vk) -a>(l + ut) (l + vk)\
Note that in a first-order approximation, equation (100) can be written
as simply:
nt = K[Yt + \|/Tt + c'£t] + $Etnt + 1 (101)
where:
c^t = (p + o-'r^-o-'gt-^ + tf]
We can also integrate equation (100) forward from time t0 to obtain:
Vt0 = E
+ tip. + c>(\\$ II
3) (102)
where the term c'^t is now included in terms independent of policy. Such
terms matter when they are part of the log-linear constraints, as in the case
of equation (61), but not when they are part of the quadratic objective.
7.6 A SECOND-ORDER APPROXIMATION TO THE INTERTEMPORAL
GOVERNMENT SOLVENCY CONDITION (EQUATION [15])
We now derive a second-order approximation to the intertemporal gov-
ernment solvency condition. We use the definition:
'Mc(Yr;^)sT (103) T= t
where:
st = xtYt-Gt- £t (104)322 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
and:
Wf = %ji«c(C,;$t) (105)
First, we take a second-order approximation of the term uc (Q; £,t) s, to
obtain:
uc(Ct;^t)st = suc + ucc~sCt + ucst + suc^t
+ \succcC
2 + uccCt~st + sCtu^t
= suc + uccsCCt + ucst + su^t
+ 2"S(MCCC + ucccC
2)Cf + CuccCtst
+ SCu^Ct + u^tst + s.o.tlp. +
= suc+ uc [- cr~





= suc + uc[-d~





+ s.o.t.i.p. + c>(||Sl|
3) (106)
where we have followed previous definitions and use the isoelastic func-
tional forms assumed. Note that we can write u~
1ur.t=c~
1ct and
- - 1 - ~ '
Cuc" ucJ^t = -d~
2ct. Plugging equation (98) into equation (106), we
obtain:
uc(Ct;l)st = sfijl -o~'Yt + o~'gt + s-i~st + ^[cr-^Sc
1 - 1) + O'
2]^
- o-'s-'{Yt - gt)st - V(s-c
lGt + o-'gt)%] (107)
+ s.o.t.i.p. +
by using previous definitions.
We recall now that the primary surplus is defined as:Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 323
which can be expanded in a second-order expansion to get:
s^~st = (1 + (og)(Yt + xt) - s~d





+ s.o.t.i.p. + c>{\\ Z, ||
3) (108)
where we have defined sd = s/Y, (dg = (G+ \)/s and t,t = {t,t- Q/Y. Using equation (108) to substitute for st in equation (107), we obtain:
uc(Q;|t)st = fiic
+ o-
a (1 + (o g )gf xf ] + s.o.t.i.p. + cKW \ II
3) (109)
Substituting equation (109) in equation (103), we obtain:
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We note from equation (110) that:
= &-i - nf - d
ltt + ct) + ^ .! - JC, - d^C, +cf)
2
Substituting in equation (98), we obtain:
-nt-
+ i^.! - nt - o~\Yt - gt)f + s.o.tlp. + t'>(\\Z,\\
3)
which can be written as:
+ s.o.tlp. + ^
Wt = £(_!- nt + (o'xxt
where
w'x = [0 -<J~
l]





















_! - nt + wxxt
- (3) b'xxt
bt - nt + l + w'xxt + 1
Integrating equation (110) forward, we obtain:
(111)
(112)
where we have included b'^t,t in t.i.p.Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 325
7.7 A QUADRATIC POLICY OBJECTIVE (EQUATIONS [19] AND [20])
We now derive a quadratic approximation to the policy objective func-
tion. To this end, we combine equations (102) and (112) in a way that elim-
inates the linear term in equation (93). Indeed, we find $v $2 so that:
•bxb'x + $2c'x = a'x = [0 O]
The solution is given by:
v2 - p
where:
r = (co + a-




and so on. Hence:
t = to
f = to
t = t0326 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD






n */ 1 ri + CO,)(l + CO)
-
1) + O(C0 + O~
l)
 8T
(1 + coT)(l + co.) ^ ~Y
We have defined:
0 0 0 0 0
with:
Oco, i ,
- — 1 c"
1 #T-1
Y
 Dd G~ ,
,-1 coj
r









We have defined Y*, the desired level of output, as:
Finally:
is a transitory component.
Equation (113) corresponds to equation (19). In particular, given the
commitments on the initial values of the vector Xt0, Wto implies that Wto is
given when characterizing the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Ff0 and Kt0 imply that Wt0 and Zt0 are also given. It follows that the value of the transitory component Tf0 is predetermined under stage two of the
Ramsey problem. Hence, over the set of admissible policies, higher values
of equation (113) correspond to lower values of:Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 327
^0n " V)
1 + h«n?\ (114)
^ J
It follows that we may rank policies in terms of the implied value of the
discounted quadratic loss function in equation (114) which corresponds to
equation (20). Because this loss function is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking
linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second order using only a first-
order approximation to the equilibrium evolution of inflation and output
under a given policy. Hence, the log-linear approximate structural rela-
tions in equations (101) and (111) are sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
Similarly, it suffices that we use log-linear approximations to the variables
Vt0 and Wt0 in describing the initial commitments, which are given by:
^ZVa -7Ct0+ w'xXtQ+
Then an optimal policy from a timeless perspective is a policy from date
t0 onward that minimizes the quadratic loss function in equation (114)
subject to the constraints implied by the linear structural relations in
equations (101) and (111) holding in each period t > t0, given the initial val-
ues bto-i, Ato-i and subject also to the constraints that certain predeter-
mined values for Vt0 and W (or alternatively, for m0 and for Yt0) be
achieved.
3
9 We note that under the assumption co + O"
1 > coT = f / (1 - f),
F > 0, which implies that q^ > 0. If:
sc>
then qy > 0 and the objective function is convex. Because the expression on
the right side of this inequality is necessarily less than one (given that T > 0),
the inequality is satisfied for all values of sG less than a positive upper
bound.
7.8 THE LOG-LINEAR AGGREGATE-SUPPLY RELATION AND THE
COST-PUSH DISTURBANCE TERM
The AS equation (101) can be written as:
nt = K[yf + \|/rf + M,] + pEt7Uf + 1 (115)
39. The constraint associated with a predetermined value for Zt0 can be neglected in a first-
order characterization of optimal policy because the variable Z, does not appear in the
first-order approximation to the aggregate-supply relation.328 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
where ut is composite cost-push shock defined as ut = c^f + Y*. We can
write equation (115) as:
nt = K\yt + \|/(xf - T*)] + pE,7cf + 1 (116)
where we have further defined:
where:
OcoT _, _ ,
,r °
A " '




c qyT((M + <7-')
(l-O)
we finally define:
so that we can write equation (101) as:
n* = K[(Y — Y*) + ii/(T - T*)1 + B£ K (117)
which is equation (23).
7.9 THE LOG-LINEAR INTERTEMPORAL SOLVENCY CONDITION AND THE
FISCAL STRESS DISTURBANCE TERM
The flow budget constraint in equation (111) can be solved forward to
yield the intertemporal solvency condition:
bi_l - nt - O'
lyt =-/, + (!•Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 329
where ft/ the fiscal stress disturbance term, is defined as:
ft = C-'igt-V) ~ (1-






7.10 DEFINITION OF THE COEFFICIENTS IN SECTIONS 3,4, AND 5
The coefficients mv,nv,nb,inb,mb, co^ are defined as:330 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
nb = MV"
1 - l)(mv + n9)
mb=- n,[(l - p^if/"
1 - (1 - p)by - a"
1]
mb = o-
1^ + a), - (1





The coefficients (ij and |i2 of Section 5 are defined as:
_ KVj/
7.11 PROOF OF DETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE OPTIMAL
TARGETING RULES
We now show that there is a determinate equilibrium if policy is con-
ducted to ensure that the two target criteria:
Etni + 1 = 0 (119)
and:
Ayt + (D^m, + n,p)jct - co^n^ATif = 0 (120)
are satisfied in each period t > tQ. Note that equation (120) can be written
as:
Ay, = Y3nf + Y4nf-i (121)
where:
y3 = - w;
1^
y4 = - co^n,
Use equation (119), combined with:
x, - xt = K"
1^, - xj/'^t - K~
1$Etnt + 1 (122)Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy • 331
and:
EtAyt + 1 = - ©^
to eliminate Et nt
bt_! - nt - o~
ly
Etyt + 1 and %t- f* from:
ft = (1 - tfo - t*)]
Then equation (120) can be used to eliminate yt from the resulting expres-
sion to obtain an equation of the form:
mA1nt m43yt_l + et
where £( is an exogenous disturbance. The system consisting of this equa-





























Because M is lower triangular, its eigenvalues are the four diagonal
elements: 0, 0, 1, and P"
1. Hence, there is exactly one eigenvalue outside
the unit circle, and equilibrium is determinate (but possesses a unit root).
Because of the triangular form of the matrix, one can also easily solve
explicitly for the elements of the left eigenvector:
v' = [vx v2 v3 1]
associated with the eigenvalue P"
1, where:
Vl = (1 + co^hr
1 - 1] py4 - (1 - P(T-
1Y4) - (1 - P)(l -
+ (1 + co^)[\i/"
1 - l]y3/
v3 =332 • BENIGNO & WOODFORD
By pre-multiplying the vector equation (123) by v', one obtains a scalar
equation with a unique nonexplosive solution of the form:
If vl * 0, this can be solved for nt as a linear function of nt_v yt-ybt-i the exogenous state vector:
n* = - VT ^-i - vf ^-i - vf^-i
+ vr/< (
124)
The solution for 7it can then be substituted into the above equations to
obtain the equilibrium dynamics of yt and btr and hence of xt.
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Benigno and Woodford seek to offer an integrated analysis of optimal fis-
cal and monetary policy building on two branches of the literature. The
Prepared for the 2003 NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference, April 4-5, 2003.1 wish to
thank Larry Christiano and Henry Siu for stimulating discussions.334 • ALBANESI
first is the one on dynamic optimal taxation, stemming from the seminal
contribution of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
1 The second part of the literature
is on optimal monetary stabilization policy for example, in Goodfriend
and King (1997). Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2000).
2
Both areas in the literature consider the problem of a benevolent govern-
ment seeking to stabilize the response of economic outcomes to exoge-
nous shocks with a combination of fiscal and monetary policies chosen
once and for all at some previous date. The optimal taxation literature
considers fiscal shocks, such as fluctuations in government expenditures,
and rules out lump-sum taxes in the tradition of Ramsey (1927).
Distortionary taxes generate wedges between marginal rates of transfor-
mation and marginal rates of substitution, and government policy
becomes a source of frictions. The monetary stabilization literature,
instead, considers environments where frictions are present even without
government policy. These frictions are due to nominal rigidities and
imperfect competition in product or labor markets. The corresponding
wedges reduce the level of economic activity and may be subject to sto-
chastic fluctuations, known as cost-push shocks. The government's only
fiscal policy instrument is a lump-sum tax.
Both parts of the literature are characterized by an underlying tension.
The fiscal shocks considered by the optimal taxation literature do not
affect any wedges and should ideally be offset through lump-sum taxes.
Yet the government has access only to distortionary fiscal instruments.
The optimal stabilization literature considers fluctuations in wedges that
could be offset with appropriate fiscal instruments acting on the same
margins, but the government has access only to lump-sum taxes. Given
this tension, monetary policy acquires an auxiliary role in responding to
shocks. Lucas and Stokey show that it is optimal to respond to fiscal
shocks by appropriately setting the state contingent returns on govern-
ment debt. Taxes and real returns on government debt inherit the serial
correlation structure of underlying shocks, and taxes are smooth, in the
sense of having a small variance relative to fiscal shocks. Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe (1991, 1995) extend the analysis to monetary
economies with risk-free debt and show that it is optimal to use state-con-
tingent inflation as a fiscal shock absorber. They find that the standard
deviation of optimal taxes is close to zero, while real returns on govern-
ment debt are highly volatile for calibrated examples. In the monetary
stabilization literature, rigidities in nominal prices and wages imply that
1. An excellent survey of this literature can be found in Chari and Kehoe (1999).
2. Additional important contributions in this literature are King and Wolman (1999); Kahn,
King, and Wolman (2000); and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).Comment • 335
innovations in inflation reduce the average markups and increase equi-
librium output. At the same time, nominal rigidities imply that inflation
generates relative price distortions. The resulting trade-off between infla-
tion and output stabilization implies that the volatility and persistence of
optimal inflation will depend on the stochastic properties of the cost-
push disturbances and on the degree of nominal rigidity. Hence, the inter-
dependence between fiscal and monetary policy is generated in both
branches of the literature by a lack of appropriate fiscal instruments.
Given appropriate instruments, the government would be indifferent to
the stochastic path of inflation.
Recent contributions to the optimal taxation literature, such as Correia,
Nicolini, and Teles (2001); Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001); and Siu (2001),
have incorporated monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity.
Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2001) assume that state-contingent bonds are
available. Their theoretical analysis allows for fiscal shocks as well as cost-
push shocks, and shows that the same equilibrium outcomes as those in a
flexible price economy can be achieved. In addition, they describe the
assumptions about fiscal instruments required for the path of inflation to
be neutral to equilibrium outcomes, thus remarking the auxiliary role of
inflation in this class of policy problems. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001)
and Siu (2001) focus on government consumption shocks and do not
allow for state-contingent debt, thus reinstating the role of inflation as a
fiscal shock-absorber. With sticky prices, however, the benefits of volatile
inflation must be balanced against the resource misallocation resulting
from the associated relative price distortions. They find that, for govern-
ment consumption processes with similar volatility to the postwar United
States, the departures from optimal policy with flexible prices are striking.
Optimal inflation volatility is close to zero, even for very small degrees of
price rigidity. Tax rates and the real value of government debt exhibit ran-
dom walk behavior, as in Barro (1979), regardless of the degree of auto-
correlation of the underlying shocks. Siu (2001) also considers large fiscal
shocks, such as fluctuations in government expenditure that would arise
in an economy alternating between war and peace. He finds that optimal
inflation volatility is high regardless of the degree of price stickiness for
large fiscal shocks. The intuition for this is that the benefits of using infla-
tion as a shock-absorber outweigh the costs of the resulting misallocation
in this case. Hence, the stochastic properties of taxes and inflation in a
Ramsey equilibrium with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidi-
ties can be understood as the outcome of a struggle between the costs of
volatile inflation and the benefits of smoothing government outlays in the
face of fiscal shocks.336 • ALBANESI
Benigno and Woodford's main contribution is to allow for both fiscal
and cost-push shocks. Their analytical results demonstrate that the differ-
ent time-series behavior of optimal policies in flexible and sticky-price
environments do not depend on the nature of the underlying shocks. With
flexible prices, state-contingent inflation is used to offset fiscal shocks,
implying volatile real debt returns. Because taxes are set to offset cost-
push shocks and stabilize output, however, their variance is not necessar-
ily small. With sticky prices, volatile inflation is costly and taxes are used
to respond to both fiscal and cost-push shocks. Taxes and real debt returns
have a unit root behavior, regardless of the stochastic properties of under-
lying shocks, and output cannot be stabilized. Benigno and Woodford's
quantitative exercise is limited, however, to fiscal shocks. They find that
the optimal response of inflation to a one-time increase in government
expenditure is inversely related to the degree of price rigidity. This is not
surprising, given the findings in the previous studies.
The rest of this comment expands on the previous discussion. In Section 2,
I relate the analytical results in Benigno and Woodford to those in the lit-
erature on optimal taxation. The section discusses the benefits and costs
of state-contingent inflation as a function of the volatility of exogenous
shocks and raises several concerns about the solution method. Section 3
illustrates the notion of optimal policy from a timeless perspective with a
simple example and relates it to limited commitment. I conclude with
some questions for further research.
2. Optimal Policy with Nominal Rigidities
Benigno and Woodford (BW) adopt a standard new Keynesian frame-
work with monopolistic competition in product markets and Calvo pric-
ing. They allow for labor market frictions by assuming that a wage
markup as well as a price markup are present, and they abstract from
monetary frictions. There are four types of shocks: government consump-
tion shocks, government transfer shocks, preference shocks, and wage
markup shocks. The first three are common to the optimal taxation litera-
ture, while wage markup shocks are typically considered by the optimal
monetary stabilization literature. The government's objective is to maxi-
mize the representative agent's lifetime utility. In the linear-quadratic
problem, the government has two policy instruments; the tax rate on
sales, it, and the inflation rate, nt.
3 These instruments are set to respond to
a cost-push shock, ut, and a fiscal shock, /,. The variables ut and ft are not
primitive shocks but a complex convolution of those primitive distur-
3. All variables denote percentage deviations from steady-state values.Comment • 337
bances. In particular, the primitive shocks contributing to the cost-push or
fiscal shock depend on the available policy instruments and on the degree
of price stickiness. However, the shock ut can arise only if wage markup
shocks are present.
The evolution of equilibrium outcomes in response to the shocks and
government policy is summarized by the expectational Phillips curve:
nt + 1 (1)
The expression in equation (1) makes clear that by setting the tax rate
according to x* = - wt/\|/, the government can completely stabilize output
in the face of cost-push shocks because cost-push shocks and the tax rate
on sales act on the same margin. Hence, fluctuations in equilibrium out-
put away from the steady state behave according to:
The evolution of equilibrium outcomes and policy must also satisfy the
government's intertemporal budget constraint:
ft-nt- o-'yt - (1 -P)Et]•>-'(&«* + h<$t ~ *D) = 0 T= t
This equation clarifies that setting taxes equal to x* requires inflation to
respond fully to the fiscal stress shock.
The government strives to achieve three goals (see equation [20] in
BW). The first two, output and inflation stabilization, appear directly in
the objective function. The third goal is to minimize the intertemporal cost
of raising government revenues measured by (j)2/t, the multiplier on the
government's intertemporal budget constraint. These goals are traded off
based on the available policy instruments. In the monetary stabilization
literature, taxes are lump-sum and §2,t ~ 0- Hence,/, does not influence yt
or nt. However, ut cannot be offset and yt ^ 0.
In the optimal taxation literature, the stochastic properties of optimal
policy depend on whether the returns on government debt are state con-
tingent. In a monetary economy with nominal risk-free debt, bond returns
can be made state contingent by setting the process for inflation appro-
priately. If no distortions are associated with inflation, as in the case with
fully flexible prices, it is optimal to use inflation as a fiscal shock absorber:
nt ~
 Et-i^t = ft ~ Ef-i/t
bt = - EJt + 1
as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991, 1995). Taxes can then be set to
meet the output stabilization objective so that xt = x* and yt = 0. This338 • ALBANESI
implies that the cost of raising government revenues is equalized across
states in each period:
<t>2,f = <t>2,t-l
Consequently, xt/ nt/ and bt inherit the stochastic properties of the under-
lying shocks. If the primitive shocks are stationary tax rates, inflation, and
the real value of government debt will also be stationary. The difference
with a Ramsey model with only shocks to government spending is that
smoothing the cost of raising fiscal revenues across states does not corre-
spond to a smooth path of taxes. The volatility of the optimal taxes will
depend on the volatility of the cost-push shocks.
With nominal risk-free debt and some degree of price rigidity, the prop-
erties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy resemble those in a real econ-
omy and risk-free debt, as in Barro (1979) and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and Seppala (2002). The optimal policy will smooth the cost of raising taxes
over time, given the costs of fully smoothing it across states. This imparts a
martingale behavior to the shadow cost of raising government revenues:
<t>2,f = Ef4>2,(+1 (
2)
Inflation does not fully respond to fiscal stress:
nt = -
and taxes cannot be set to stabilize output fully:
The unit-root behavior of the shadow cost of raising government rev-
enues makes the equilibrium response of taxes, output, prices, and the
real value of government debt to cost-push and fiscal shocks nonstation-
ary, regardless of the autocorrelation properties of the primitive shocks.
2.1 DISCUSSION
While in a real economy with risk-free debt, the government has no
alternative but to smooth the cost of raising distortionary revenues
according to equation (2), in a monetary economy with nominal bonds, it
is possible to make bond returns state-contingent in real terms by setting
ex post inflation. If nominal rigidities are present, however, the govern-
ment faces a trade-off between the costs of market incompleteness and the
costs of volatile inflation. The properties of optimal policy will depend on
the relative size of these costs. BW and previous studies focus on models
in which the resource misallocation associated with volatile inflationComment • 339
increases with the degree of price stickiness. The costs of market incom-
pleteness, on the other hand, should depend on the size and persistence
of the primitive shocks. To understand this issue, it is useful to review the
findings in Siu (2001) for a similar environment because BW's linear
quadratic approach cannot be used to explore this aspect.
4
Siu studies Ramsey policy in a cash-credit good economy with monop-
olistic competition in which a fraction of firms in each period sets their
prices before current exogenous shocks are realized. The remaining firms
set prices after the realization of the current exogenous shocks.
5
Government purchases, g, follow a two-state first-order Markov process
with support: [g, g] and g < g. Siu characterizes optimal policies as a func-
tion of the unconditional standard deviation of government purchases
with a nonlinear numerical procedure. He finds that the optimal inflation
volatility decreases with the degree of price stickiness for business-cycle
fluctuations in g, while for ^-processes designed to model an economy
fluctuating between war and peace—large fiscal shocks—optimal infla-
tion volatility is high regardless of the degree of price stickiness, as illus-
trated in Figures 1 and 2, reproduced from Siu.
6
The percentage loss in output that occurs in the economy with sticky
prices under the Ramsey policy corresponding to the flexible-price econ-
omy is a measure of the misallocation caused by volatile inflation. Figure 3
illustrates the behavior of this measure.
7 The horizontal axis measures
Ls/Lf, the labor demand from sticky-price firms relative to flexible-price
firms, and the vertical axis measures the corresponding misallocation. In
each graph, the star on the left corresponds to a sequence [g, g]; the one
on the right corresponds to a sequence [g, g].
s When the current value of
g is low, sticky-price firms have higher prices than flexible-price firms and
Ls/Lf < 1. Concavity in production implies that the cost in terms of fore-
gone output is very large for a large misallocation and decreases at a
decreasing rate. The graphs suggest that the misallocation cost is large
4. The approximation is valid only for stochastic processes with an absorbing state and a
small range. See Section 2.2 for further discussion.
5. The impact effect of a shock on the nominal price index in Siu's model is the same as the
one in a model with Calvo pricing if the fraction of prices that remains unchanged in any
period is set equal across the two models. In Siu's model, all remaining price adjustment
takes place in the subsequent period, while the adjustment is smoothed across several
periods with Calvo pricing.
6. The calibration is based on U.S. data for the twentieth century. The small-shock case
matches fluctuations in government purchases that occur in the postwar United States.
The transition probability between the g and g states is p = 0.95, and the standard devia-
tion of g is 6.7%. For the large-shock case, the standard deviation is 21% and all other
parameters are kept constant.
7.1 thank Henry Siu for providing Figure 3 and Figure 4.
8. Given the assumed persistence of the government consumption process, these are the
most likely sequences.340 • ALBANESI
and increasing in the size of government spending shocks when the fluc-
tuations in the spending shock are small, but it is small for large fiscal
shocks. This pattern stems from the incentive for firms setting prices to
frontload and set high prices to insure against the possibility of having
negative profits. Because government consumption shocks are persistent,
if the shock was high in the previous period, sticky-price firms will set
high prices. If the shock in this period is high, inflation will be high under
the Ramsey policy for the flexible-price economy, and the misallocation
will be small. If the shock was low in the previous period, firms setting
prices will still set them high. If the realized value of g is low, inflation will
be low, which will give rise to a large misallocation. The tendency to front-
load is a general feature of sticky-price models and is exacerbated when
firms fix prices for longer periods of time.
Figure 4 plots the misallocation cost in consumption equivalents
against the volatility of government consumption when 10% of firms have
sticky prices. It raises steeply initially but then flattens out. The cost in
terms of foregone consumption of not being able to smooth government
Figure 1 OPTIMAL INFLATION VOLATILITY FOR SMALL SHOCKS
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Reproduced from Siu (2001)Comment • 341
Figure 2 OPTIMAL INFLATION VOLATILITY FOR LARGE SHOCKS
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Reproduced from Siu (2001)
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revenues across states as a function of the variability of government con-
sumption shocks is also shown.
9 Not surprisingly it is increasing in the
variance of the shocks. This explains the finding that, for large govern-
ment expenditure shocks, optimal inflation volatility is high even when a
large fraction of prices are fixed, while for business-cycle type fluctuations
in government consumption, optimal inflation volatility is close to 0. For
very small expenditure shocks, the costs of not using inflation to make
real bond returns respond to government consumption is low, as is infla-
tion volatility in the Ramsey equilibrium for the flexible-price economy.
Because the distortion caused by taxation is first order, it will be optimal
to have a smooth path of taxes and volatile inflation.
1
0
The role of the size of fiscal shocks for the stochastic behavior of taxes
and policy with nominal price rigidities raises several questions for future
9. This is the welfare loss in average consumption equivalents of using the Ramsey policy
for the sticky-price economy in the flexible-price economy.
10. This is true in BW's model. Recall that the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor, <J>,
is positive if the initial level of public debt is positive.342 • ALBANESI
research. Do these results depend on the nature of the shock? Would they
differ if government transfers rather than government purchases were
considered? Would the findings change for wage markup shocks? This
issue is of interest because the consideration of wedge-type shocks is
the novelty in BW's analysis. And last, what is the welfare cost of the
lack of state-contingency relative to nonfiscal shocks? These questions
cannot be addressed within BW's linear-quadratic approach, as I
explain below.
2.2 THE LINEAR-QUADRATIC APPROACH
BW solve the optimal policy problem by analyzing the exact solution to
a linear-quadratic problem, which should coincide with the solution to a
linear approximation of the policy problem for the original economy. This
amounts to a local approximation around a nonstochastic steady state.
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1995) provide several examples of inaccu-
rate linear approximations in a similar context. They show that the inac-
curacy is particularly severe for the computation of policies. In one
Figure 3 THE OUTPUT COST OF RELATIVE PRICE DISTORTIONS
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Reproduced from Shi (2001)Comment • 343
example, for which the analytical solution is available, they show that the
linear approximation misses on basic statistics such as the mean and the
standard deviation of tax rates. The degree of inaccuracy appears to
increase with the curvature of preference and technology parameters and
with the volatility of driving processes.
An additional and more severe concern arises in the model with sticky
prices. Because equilibrium responses are nonstationary and the economy
drifts away from the initial steady state permanently in response to
shocks, the analysis must be limited to stochastic processes with a small
range and with an absorbing state. This is a restrictive assumption for the
purpose of studying stabilization policy from a quantitative standpoint. It
rules out, for example, analyzing responses to business-cycle type fluctu-
ations, which are naturally of interest in macroeconomics. More impor-
tant, it raises the question of which steady state should be considered as a
benchmark for the approximation. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala
(2002) numerically characterize the Ramsey equilibrium for a real econ-
omy with risk-free debt, where the lack of state contingency of government
Figure 4 THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND TAX VOLATILITY
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debt returns also imparts a unit root behavior to taxes and real variables.
1
1
They show that if the exogenous shock has an absorbing state, the ana-
logue of §2,t converges to a value that depends on the realization of the path
for the exogenous shocks when the economy enters the absorbing state.
The incomplete markets allocation coincides with the complete markets
allocation that would have occurred under the same shocks but for a dif-
ferent initial debt. They also consider the case in which the government
expenditure process does not have an absorbing state. In this case, the ana-
logue of §2lt converges to 0. Hence, the incomplete markets allocation con-
verges to the first best allocation, and no distortionary taxes need to be
raised without upper bounds on government asset accumulation.
3. Timeless Perspective and Limited Commitment
BW characterize the solution to the policy problem from a timeless per-
spective. This approach amounts to a particular recursive formulation of
the optimal policy problem under commitment. As is well known, the
Ramsey problem is not recursive in the natural state variables, which
complicates the analysis substantially in the presence of stochastic shocks.
It is possible, however, to formulate the Ramsey problem recursively by
augmenting the set of natural state variables with a vector of costate vari-
ables, which depend on the specific problem. Solving this recursive prob-
lem gives rise to policy rules that are Markovian in the augmented set of
states and the shocks for t > 1. This method was first suggested by
Kydland and Prescott (1980) and was generalized by Marcet and
Marimon (1999). Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) and Siu
(2001) also adopt a variant of this approach. The Ramsey equilibrium out-
come depends on the values of exogenous state variables at time 0. There
are different ways to deal with this dependence. The timeless perspective
proceeds by suggesting that the Markovian policy rule, which is optimal
from the standpoint of t > 1, is also optimal at time 0. This amounts to
endogenizing the initial values of the exogenous states.
To see how this works in practice, it is useful to work through a simple
example. Government policy is given by Ylt = {xt, Rt}, where it is a linear tax on labor and Rt is the state contingent bond return. Government con-
sumption, gt, is exogenous. Consumers solve the problem:
max
\ct ,nt,bt + i}f = o
bt + l<btRt+(l-xt)nt-ct 11. Siu (2001) derives the constraint imposed on the set of attainable equilibria with sticky
prices and shows that it is of the same nature as the one arising in the real economy with
risk-free debt analyzed by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002).Comment • 345
where bt denotes holdings of government-issued bonds at time t. Their
first-order conditions are:
-unJ = Xt(l- Xxt)
l\,t — p/l( + i J\f + i
where Xt is the multiplier on their budget constraint. A competitive equi-
librium is a policy {xt, Rt, gt] and an allocation {ct, nt, bt+1 }t > 0 in which allo- cation solves the consumer's problem given the policy, and the
government budget constraint:
bt + l + xtnt = btRt + gt
is satisfied. A Ramsey equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium that max-
imizes the representative consumer's lifetime utility.
The solution to the household problem clearly displays the potential for
time inconsistency in the Ramsey problem: the fact that households have
to choose bM based on expectations of RM; hence, the government might
have an incentive to change Rt+1 at t + 1. This time inconsistency makes
the Ramsey problem nonrecursive in bt. Despite this, it is possible to for-
mulate the Ramsey problem recursively. For t > 0, the consumer's first-
order conditions can be used to define a mapping from policy at time t to
the competitive equilibrium allocation at time t and the shadow value of
outstanding wealth, Xt:
xt = (ct,nt,bt + 1) = d(bt,Ut/Xt) xt =
The policy problem can then be rewritten as follows:




g< xn + b'-Rb
The solution to this problem is the function, IT; (b, X_x), which represents
a Markovian policy rule, in the state (b, X^). The constraint X = h(§, b, X_^
embeds the assumption of commitment because it ties today's choices to
decisions made in the past by linking them through the costate variable X.
It is unusual because it goes back in time. The government solution to this
problem selects the value of X that the government wants to commit to346 • ALBANESI
because it induces future governments to choose the policy that is optimal
from the standpoint of the current period.
Clearly, this procedure does not pin down the value of ^0. This implies
that the policy problem at time 0 is different from other periods. The pol-
icy problem at time 0 is:
no(bo) = arg max u{co,no) + $v(b1,Xo) <!>o / XQ , \Q
s.t. xo= d(b0/nQ/XQ)
g< Tono + fcj-Ro&o
The policies chosen at at time 0 depend on initial conditions and influence
the solution for all future periods. Adopting a timeless perspective
involves removing this dependence on initial conditions by leave as is
that the choice of A,o and of policy at time 0 is governed by the same
Markovian rule that is optimal from time 1 onward. The system:
no(&o) =
defines an implicit equation for A,(-i) and Xo. The second constraint pins
down ^(_1} as a function of bQ and Xo, and the first constraint, which imposes consistency between the solution to the time 0 problem and the
Markovian decision rule, pins down b0. This procedure affects only the aver-
age level of taxes and does not alter the stochastic properties of the opti-
mal policy. It is important to note that the recursive formulation of
Ramsey problems discussed here does not imply that the resulting opti-
mal choices are time consistent, even if it gives rise to Markovian policy
rules. A government choosing policies sequentially under discretion
would not make these choices. The discretionary solution would generate
Markovian policy rules in the natural state, in this case, bt.
This approach is appealing not only because it provides a tractable
algorithm for solving Ramsey equilibria but also because it is related to a
notion of limited commitment. Time inconsistency may arise in Ramsey
models because private agents take certain actions before the government
chooses policy and therefore must base their decisions on expectations of
government policy. To ensure that the Ramsey equilibrium is imple-
mented, it is not required that the government commits at time 0 to the
entire path of future policy. A limited one-period-ahead commitment to
those policies that influence expectations is, in general, enough. A recur-
sive formulation of the Ramsey problem naturally identifies the minimum
set of variables that the government must commit to. A drawback is that
these variables are not primitive. They are rather complex functionsComment • 347
related to the shadow value of government surpluses at the start of the
following period. Hence, implementation of this solution with a simple
strategy is incredibly valuable.
BW suggest that the optimal policy can be implemented with the flexi-
ble inflation target:
Kt + aKt.x + b(yt - yt_x) = 0 (3)
Etnt + l = 0 (4)
They also propose a particular institutional arrangement associated
with this rule. The monetary authority should have a mandate over both
inflation and output stabilization. It should set interest rates so that equa-
tion (3) is met. The fiscal authority should have a mandate defined over
inflation stabilization only and should set the path of debt so that equa-
tion (4) is met.
This institutional setup does relate to those proposed and implemented
to tackle the potential time inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
1
2 It
embeds a notion of independence because the monetary authority takes
the path of government debt as given, and the fiscal authority takes the
path of output as given. However, endowing the fiscal authority with a
mandate over inflation stabilization seems rather unusual. One also won-
ders whether it would be viable because of the strong prevalence of polit-
ical considerations in the dabate over fiscal policy.
4. Conclusion
The Ramsey literature and the optimal monetary stabilization literature
have two important elements in common: the assumption of commitment
and the auxiliary role of monetary policy. Woodford (2000) and Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1999) have underlined how the optimal monetary
stabilization policy under commitment differs in terms of stochastic
responses from the policy under discretion. Woodford shows that infla-
tion tends to overreact to cost-push shocks under discretion relative to
commitment. This stabilization bias can arise even when no inflation bias
is present. (By inflation bias, I mean a tendency for average inflation to be
higher when the government cannot commit.) The stabilization bias arises
due to the lack of alternative policy instruments (because lump-sum taxes
cannot remove the distortions generated by cost-push shocks). Albanesi,
12. The central bank of New Zealand and most recently the central bank of Brazil follow a
flexible inflation targeting scheme.348 • ALBANESI
Chari, and Christiano (2002) show in a general equilibrium model with
monetary frictions that the resource misallocation due to price dispersion
may be large enough, with plausible parameters, to eliminate the inflation
bias under discretion. They also show that multiple Markov equilibria are
possible, giving rise to a potential for alternating high- and low-inflation
regimes under discretion. It would be interesting to explore the joint role
of monetary policies and distortionary taxation without commitment.
Would the possibility of responding to cost-push shocks via fiscal policy
remove the overreaction in inflation that occurs with lump-sum taxes?
What is optimal inflation volatility in response to fiscal shocks under dis-
cretion? Is the misallocation resulting from the price dispersion associated
with inflation sufficient to reduce the inflation bias in general?
The auxiliary role for monetary policy in these branches of the literature
stems from the fact that, in these models, money is not essential. The opti-
mal monetary stabilization literature often abstracts from money demand
altogether. The Ramsey literature usually considers money in the utility
function or cash-in-advance models. These assumptions are meant to
stand in for some role for money that is not made explicit but ought to be.
Instead, money is essential when spatial, temporal, and informational
friction makes the use of money an efficient arrangement, as in the search-
theoretic approach pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993).
1
3 The
essential nature of money has implications for optimal monetary policy.
For example, optimality of the Friedman rule generally occurs in Ramsey
models. This result stems from the fact that money does not overcome any
primitive friction, and agents use it for transactions because they are
forced to. Hence, it is optimal to equate the return on money to that of
other assets to minimize the distortions associated with this arrange-
ment.
1
4 In environments where money is essential, the optimal monetary
policy responds to changes in the distribution of liquidity needs. Levine
(1991) and Kocherlakota (2003) show that, in this case, higher interest
rates increase welfare.
1
5 Research on the properties of optimal monetary
policy when money is essential is still in its infancy; however, this class of
environments constitute the most natural laboratory for understanding
the effect of monetary policy on the economy.
13. Additional contributions include Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright (1995), Kocherlakota
(1998), and Wallace (2001).
14.1 consider (in Albanesi, 2002) a costly nonmonetary transactions model with heteroge-
neous agents in which departures from the Friedman rule redistribute toward high-
income households and the Friedman rule may not optimal.
15. See also Woodford (1990) for some related examples. Lagos and Wright (2002) show that
optimality of the Friedman rule occurs in an environment where money is essential. In
their model, however, the distribution of currency is degenerate.Comment • 349
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The paper by Benigno and Woodford makes an important contribution to
the theory of cyclical fiscal and monetary policies.
Following the tradition of Ramsey (1927), Barro (1979), and Lucas and
Stokey (1983), the neoclassical literature on optimal fiscal policy has
emphasized that, when taxation is distortionary, welfare is maximized if
the government smoothes taxes across different periods of time and dif-
ferent realizations of uncertainty. To what extent, however, such smooth-
ing is possible depends on the ability of the government to transfer
budget resources from one date and state to another. If the government
can trade a complete set of Arrow securities (or state-contingent debt),
perfect smoothing across all dates and states is possible, implying that the
Prepared for the NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference. I thank Oliver Blanchard and
Ivan Werning for helpful comments and stimulating discussions.Comment • 351
optimal tax rate is essentially invariant (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe, 1991). If instead insurance is unavailable, any
innovation in fiscal conditions needs to be spread over time, implying that
the optimal tax rate follows essentially a random walk (Barro, 1979;
Aiyagari et al., 2002).
When the government cannot trade state-contingent debt, there might
be other ways to obtain insurance. Bohn (1990) and Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1991) have argued that, when the government trades nominal
bonds, unexpected variation in inflation may generate all the desirable
variation in the real value of the outstanding public debt and may there-
fore replicate state-contingent debt. A serious caveat with this argument,
however, is that it considers a world where prices are perfectly flexible
and price volatility has no welfare consequences.
But when nominal prices are sticky, unexpected variation in the aggre-
gate level of prices creates distortions in the allocation of resources and
reduces welfare. The new Keynesian literature on optimal monetary pol-
icy has therefore stressed the importance of minimizing price volatility to
minimize inefficiencies in the cross-sectoral allocation of resources.
1
Recent work by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and Siu (2001) shows that
the conflict between insurance and price stability is likely to be resolved
overwhelmingly in favor of the latter.
2 At the same time, the new
Keynesian literature has noted that fiscal policy could, in principle, help
stabilize output by offsetting cyclical variation in monopolistic distortions
(price or wage markups), but has bypassed this possibility and instead
focused on monetary policy.
The paper by Pierpaolo Benigno and Michael Woodford merges the
new Keynesian paradigm of optimal monetary policy with the neoclassi-
cal paradigm of optimal fiscal policy. It examines the joint determination
of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of incomplete insur-
ance and sticky prices. Furthermore, it shows how one can start from a
full-fledged micro-founded model and, through a long series of approxi-
mations, end with a simple linear-quadratic framework similar to the ad-
hoc specifications used in the early contributions to both fiscal and
monetary policy.
The welfare costs of business cycles in economies with sticky prices and
incomplete markets and the consequent stabilization role of fiscal and
monetary policy are important questions. The paper by Pierpaolo
Benigno and Michael Woodford makes an important contribution in this
1. See, for example, Clarida et al. (1999), the excellent textbook by Woodford (2003), and the
references therein.
2. This result is also verified by the findings of Benigno and Woodford.352 • ANGELETOS
direction. I have one concern, however, regarding the strategy of the
paper. It is important to know that ad-hoc representations of the policy
problem can be backed up by proper micro-foundations, but in their
paper this comes at the cost of numerous linear-quadratic approxima-
tions, which I find hard to follow. The reduced-form analytic representa-
tion is hard to interpret. For example, all impulse responses are found to
depend critically on a composite exogenous variable that the authors call
"fiscal stress," but what exactly this variable is remains a mystery.
In the present discussion, I will attempt a simpler route. I will set up
an ad-hoc framework from the very beginning. This will permit us to
derive the essential results with less effort and more clarity. We will see
that, when the government has access to either lump-sum taxation or
complete insurance, the inflation rate is always zero, the output gap is
always constant, and output stabilization is obtained only via fiscal
policy. When instead there is incomplete insurance, the output gap has
a unit root, like the tax rate and the level of government debt, and
monetary policy complements fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy.
Innovations in the inflation rate, the output gap, or the tax rate are
driven by innovations in an exogenous fiscal stress variable, which
simply measures the annuity value of government spending plus the
subsidy that would have been necessary to implement the first best.
2. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Simple Model
2.1 SOCIAL WELFARE
We can approximate social welfare around the first-best outcome as:
(1)
where y* is an exogenous random variable representing the efficient (or
first-best) level of output, whereas y, and nt are the endogenous actual lev-
els of output and inflation. The last term in equation (1) reflects the wel-
fare loss associated with the distortion in the cross-sectoral allocation of
resources cause by a higher dispersion of prices.
3 The scalar co > 0 depends
on how flexible prices are. If 1 - a is the probability that a firm can adjust
prices in any given period, so that a measures the degree of price sticki-
ness, then co = co(a) is increasing in a; flexible prices correspond to a - 0
and co = 0.
3. The implicit assumption is that the first-best level of inflation is zero.Comment • 353
2.2 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
We can similarly summarize the market equilibrium with the following
condition characterizing the equilibrium level of output:
yt = -Wt + ^(7i(-(3£fTi( + 1) + 8t (2)
where \\f > 0 and % > 0. The first term in equation (2) reflects the distortion
of the tax on final output or the sale of intermediate goods. More gener-
ally, the first term can be interpreted as aggregate demand management
via fiscal policy. The second term reflects the output effect of monetary
policy when prices are sticky. The slope % = % (a) is increasing in a, the
degree of price stickinees.
4 Provided % > 0, equation (2) gives the new
Keynesian Phillips curve:
nt = pEfjc, + 1 + j(yt-y")
where y" = - \|/T, + ef represents the natural level of output. Finally, the
exogenous random variable et captures what the literature has called a
cost-push shock (e.g., Clarida et al. 1999). As will become clear, variation
in Et is isomorphic to variation in yf; either one reflects variation in
markups and other shorts or distortions, namely, shocks that affect the
natural level of output differently from the efficient level.
2.3 THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET
Suppose the government trades only one-period discount bonds, both real
and nominal. For simplicity, I will ignore seigniorage and the fiscal effect
of variations in either the growth rate of output or the real interest rate. I
will also assume that the government freely adjusts the level of real bond
issues but keeps the level of nominal bond issues constant at some level d
(as a fraction of gross domestic product [GDP]), and treats d as a parame-
ter. The government budget then reduces to the following equation:
5
4. Provided % > 0, equation (2) gives the new Keynesian Phillips curve:
n, = PE(jt( + ! + y (y, - y"t),
where y" = - *FT, + ef represents the natural level of output.
5. To see this, let vt and D, denote the quantity of real and nominal bonds issued in the end
of period t (as a fraction of GDP) and write the government budget as:
+ r, ' 1 + Rt P,
The first term represents the total real liabilities of the government in the beginning of
period t, while the last term represents the revenue from the issue of new bonds. P, is the
price level, x, is the real interest rate, and Rt is the nominal interest rate. Next, let 1/P, =
(1 - 7it)/PM, (1 + x,)-
1 « p, (1 + Rt)-
1 = p (1 - E, nt+1), and DM/Tf-i = Dt/Pt = d; and define
bt = vt + D,/P,. The budget constraint then reduces to equation (3).354 • ANGELETOS
bt.^[xt + zt+d{nt-^Etnt + 1)-gt] + flbt (3)
The term bt denotes the total level of public debt (as a fraction of GDP),
and %t denotes the tax rate on aggregate income. The initial value of debt
is b_x = b. The term gt denotes the level of government spending (also as a
fraction of GDP) and follows a stationary Markov process with mean Egt
= g. The term d {%t - $Et nM) captures the gains from unexpected deflation
of nominal debt. Finally, zt captures any state-contingent lump-sum trans-
fers the government potentially receives from the private sector. These
may reflect either direct lump-sum taxation or various explicit and
implicit kinds of insurance (other than the inflation of nominal debt). I
will later distinguish three cases: (1) unrestricted lump-sum taxation, in
which case zt is a free control variable; (2) no lump-sum taxation but com-
plete insurance, in which case zt has to satisfy only the constraint Et_^ zt = 0;
(3) no lump-sum taxation and no insurance, in which case zt = 0 in all peri-
ods and events.
2.4 THE RAMSEY PROBLEM
The government seeks to maximize social welfare subject to its budget
constraint and the equilibrium condition for aggregate economic activity.
Hence, the Ramsey problem is given by:
(4)
s.t. yt = - \\rxt + %(nt - PEf7if + 1) + e(
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as L= ZjloP'E, [Lt], where:
(yt - y*)
2 + co:
- (xt -gt + zt) - d(nt - p7i( + 1)] (5)
u, > 0 represents the shadow value of real resources and Xt > 0 represents the
shadow cost of the government budget.
6 Taking the First order conditions
(FOCs) with respect to yt, nlr bt, and xf/ and using the last one to substitute for [it, we conclude to the following optimality conditions.
7
6. Note that the exogenous disturbances of the economy are given by s, = (y*, £„ gt) and the
endogenous variables (nt, xt, yt, bt) are contingent on s
f = (s0,..., s(). Along the optimal plan, however, the history in the beginning of period t can be summarized by (\it_lf Xw). See Marcet and Marimon (2001).
7. To be precise, equation (7) holds for t > 1. Period t = 0 is special for the usual reason,
namely, that expectations formed in the past are now sunk.Comment • 355
(6)
-K-i) (7)
ht - £t^f + i (8)
These conditions, together with the equilibrium output condition in equa-
tion (2), the budget constraint in equation (3), and the initial condition
fo_i = b, pin down the optimal policy plan.
Note that equations (7) and (8) imply Et nM = 0. Note also that both the
optimal output gap and the optimal inflation rate are determined merely
by the shadow cost of government budget resources (the multiplier Xt).
Finally, equation (8) states that the shadow cost of government budget
resources follows a random walk. This property reflects intertemporal
smoothing, which is possible as long as the government can freely borrow
and lend in riskless bonds. How large is the variance of the innovation in
Xt depends critically on how much insurance the government may obtain
against the fiscal consequences of business cycles.
2.5 THE FIRST BEST
Suppose for a moment that the government had unlimited access to
lump-sum taxation. This means that the government can freely choose zt.
The FOC, with respect to zt, implies Xt = 0, for all periods and events. That
is, the shadow cost of the government budget is always zero, reflecting
simply the fact that there is unrestricted lump-sum taxation. It follows
that:
yt - y* = 0 and nt = 0 (9)
meaning that there is complete output and price stabilization exactly at
the first-best levels.
The first-best outcome is implemented by setting the tax rate so that the
aggregate supply condition is satisfied at the efficient level of output with
zero inflation. This gives:
Tt = Tt = -±tf + Et) (10)
The sum y* + ef measures the overall distortion in the economy due to
monopolistic competition or other market imperfections, and xf repre-
sents the Pigou tax (or subsidy) that corrects any such distortion and
implements the first-best outcome. (In the case of monopolistic distortions,356 • ANGELETOS
output is inefficiently low, and therefore x* < 0, meaning that the govern-
ment uses a subsidy to offset the monopolistic distortions.) Finally to bal-
ance the government budget, we can pick the level of lump-sum taxes so
that they are enough to finance the level of government spending, plus the
interest payments on the initial public debt, plus the subsidy that imple-
ments the first-best level of output. That is, we let zt = (gt- xf) + (1 - $)b.
2.6 OPTIMAL POLICY WITH COMPLETE MARKETS
Suppose now that lump-sum taxation is not available, but the govern-
ment can issue state-contingent debt (or otherwise replicate full insur-
ance). The government chooses zt subject to the constraint Et_xzt - O.The FOCs with respect to zt/ together with equation (8), now imply Xt = X> 0
for all periods and events. That is, the shadow value of tax revenues is
positive (because taxation is distortionary) but constant across all periods
and events (because markets are complete). It follows that:
This outcome is now obtained by setting:
where x* = - % (y * + et) is again the Pigou tax that would implement the
first best, and letting
zt = (gt-it)-(g-
!i) (13)
where g = Egt and f = Ext. That is, variation in zt absorbs any business-cycle
variation in either the level of government spending or the subsidy that
implements the first-best level of output. Finally, to compute X, note that
the government budget clears if and only if x = g + (1 - (3)S, which together
with equation (12) implies:
l = i|/
2[(l-p)6 + (g-x*)] (14)
That is, the (constant) shadow cost of budget resources is proportional
to the interest cost of public debt, plus the annuity value of government
spending, plus the annuity value of the subsidy that would be necessary
to implement the first best. It follows that the (constant) output gap is
higher the higher the initial level of public debt, the higher the average
level of government spending, or the higher the monopolistic distortion in
the economy. Finally, substituting equation (14) in equation (12), we infer:Comment • 357
Tt = X + tf - X*) (15)
where x = g + (1 - (3) b. Note that x corresponds to the optimal tax rate in
a neoclassical economy, such as in Barro (1979) or Lucas and Stokey
(1983). In the presence of a Keynesian business cycle, the optimal tax rate
inherits in addition a cyclical component, the latter being the cyclical vari-
ation in the Pigou subsidy that would have implemented the first-best
level of output. Fiscal policy can thus eliminate the inefficient business
cycle by simply offsetting the cyclical variation in the monopolistic (or
other) distortion.
To see how fiscal policy works under complete markets, consider a
negative shock in the output gap (a shock that reduces the natural rate of
output more than the first-best level). The government can offset this
shock and fully stabilize the output gap by simply lowering the rate of
taxation while keeping the price level constant. This policy leads to a pri-
mary deficit, but the latter is totally covered by an increase in state-
contingent transfers. Hence, the government does not need to issue any
new public debt, and the stabilization policy has no fiscal consequences
for the future.
2.7 OPTIMAL POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS
Finally, consider the case that the government cannot obtain any insurace.
It is useful to define the variable:
t& + /-<+/) (16) ; = 0
which measures the annuity value of government spending plus the
annuity value of the subsidy that is necessary to implement the first best,
and let \t=ft~ Et-ift denote the innovation in this variable. (The term/,
corresponds to the mysterious object that Benigno and Woodford call the
fiscal stress variable.) After some tedious algebra, we can show that the
shadow value of budget resources satisfies:
Vi = V
2[(l-P)Vi + Et-i/t] and K-K-i=n*>t
for some constant r| > 0. That is, the shadow cost of budget resources is
proportional to the interest cost of public debt, plus the annuity value of
government spending, plus the annuity value of the subsidy that would
be necessary to implement the first best; the innovation in the shadow
cost of budget resources is proportional to the innovation in the fiscal
stress variable/. It follows that any transitory change in/ results in a per-
manent change in A,,, which manifests the effect of intertemporal tax358 • ANGELETOS
smoothing. Finally, using equation (17) together with the equations (6) to
(8), we conclude with the following impulse-response functions:
nt = <PnZ>t, (18)
(20)
for some constant q>n, (p , (px > 0. It follows that inflation is white noise.
8 The
output gap and the tax rate, however, follow a martingale plus a station-
ary component, which is proportional to the change in the output gap
(that is, the distance from the first best). This cyclical component of opti-
mal fiscal and monetary policy is absent in the neoclassical paradigm
(Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983) and arises here because cyclical vari-
ation exists in the extent of distortions in the economy. Finally, the coeffi-
cients 9^, cpy/ and cpx are decreasing in d, reflecting the fact that a higher
level of nominal debt permits the government to obtain more insurance
with less inflation volatility.
To see how fiscal policy works under incomplete markets, consider a
negative shock in the output gap (a shock that reduces the natural rate of
output more than the first-best rate). Contrary to what was the case with
complete markets, the government cannot fully stabilize the output gap
and keep the price level constant at the same time. Because complete
insurance is no longer available, lowering the contemporaneous rate of
taxation necessarily results in a primary deficit that has to be financed by
an increase in public debt and thus an increase in future taxes. The gov-
ernment thus finds it optimal to lower the tax rate by less than what it
would have done under complete markets, that is, by less than what is
necessary to offset the negative cyclical shock. And because fiscal policy
can no longer do it all, it becomes optimal to use monetary policy also for
the purpose of output stabilization. Actually, an unexpected increase in
inflation not only stimulates aggregate demand but also lowers the real
value of nominal public debt and thus eases fiscal conditions.
Nonetheless, monetary policy cannot do it all either. Because inflation sur-
prises distort the cross-sectoral allocation of resources, the government
finds it optimal to raise inflation by an amount less than what would be
necessary to stabilize output fully and cover the primary deficit. Overall,
8. Note that the white-noise result for inflation is not robust to the introduction of lags in
fiscal policy. The martingale property for fiscal policy and the output gap, however, is
likely to be robust to more general frameworks.Comment • 359
both fiscal and monetary policy are now used to stabilize output, but the
negative cyclical shock is only partly offset and results in a permanent
increase in the level of public debt and thereby in a permanent increase in
taxes and a permanent reduction in output.
3. Conclusion
I conclude with some important (at least in my view) open questions
about fiscal policy over the business cycle.
First, the theory suggests that there are important welfare gains to be
made if the government traded state-contingent debt (or at least gains of
the same order of magnitude as the gains from eliminating business
cycles). And if state-contingent debt is not available, our models predict
that the government could obtain insurance by appropriately designing
the maturity structure of public debt (Angeletos, 2002) or the cyclical
properties of consumption taxes (Correia et al., 2002). Similarly, the gov-
ernment could replicate more insurance with less cyclical variation in
inflation by issuing a lot of nominal debt and at the same time investing
in real assets to keep the overall level of public debt at the desired level.
Yet none of these forms of insurance appear to play an important role in
practice. Why not?
9
Second, the implications of incomplete insurance become even more
interesting once we abandon the simple linear-quadratic framework. If
the lack of insurance is due to exogenous reasons, then a precautionary
motive dictates that the government should accumulate a large amount of
assets to use it as a buffer stock against cyclical shocks (Aiyagari et al.,
2002). If instead the lack of insurance is due to the government's own
moral hazard, then a desire to minimize the costs of providing future gov-
ernments with optimal incentives dictates that the government should
accumulate a large amount of debt (Sleet, 2002). But which of the two
opposite predictions should we follow?
Third, consider the comparison of fiscal and monetary policy as instru-
ments for managing the business cycle. The simple model presented here,
the more elaborate models of Correia et al. (2002) or Benigno and
Woodford, and probably any model we teach our graduate students share
the prediction that fiscal policy cannot do all (if markets are complete) or
most (if markets are incomplete) of the job of stabilizing the economy.
One could even argue that fiscal policy is superior to monetary policy in
9. Moral hazard in government behavior is only part of the answer: If it were severe enough
to explain complete lack of insurance, one would also expect the government customarily
to default on (domestic) public debt, which is not the case in reality.360 • ANGELETOS
stabilizing the economy because its effectiveness does not depend on the
extent of nominal rigidities. In practice, however, fiscal policy is quickly
dismissed on the basis that it takes time to implement changes in fiscal
policy and even more time for these changes to have an effect on eco-
nomic activity. But where is the hard proof for this? And even if there are
important lags involved in discretionary cyclical fiscal policy, why don't
we undertake the necessary reforms to reduce them, or why don't we
redesign the existing automatic stabilizers to implement the optimal
cyclical variation in fiscal policy? Or why should a systematic fiscal pol-
icy rule have a weaker and slower impact on market incentives than a sys-
tematic monetary policy rule? Similarly, cyclical fiscal policy may have a
differential impact on different sectors of the economy, but this is equally
true for monetary policy. I am not totally convinced that monetary policy
is intrinsically more effective as an instrument for managing the business
cycle, I believe that we should carefully investigate the alleged asymme-
tries between fiscal and monetary policies, and I wonder if it is mostly a
historical coincidence that economists and policymakers alike have been
obsessed with monetary policy.
1
0
Finally, consider the nature of the shocks that justify policy interven-
tion. The conventional wisdom is that we should try to stabilize the actual
level of output, or the gap between the actual level and some smoother
level (the empirically measured natural rate). The theory instead dictates
that we should stabilize the gap between the actual and the first-best level
of output because it minimizes welfare losses. What is more, the canoni-
cal model predicts that productivity and taste shocks move the actual and
the first-best level of output proportionally, in which case there is no inef-
ficient business cycle and thus no reason for countercyclical policy.
1
1 The
resolution to this unappealing theoretical prediction has been to introduce
ad hoc shocks that perturb directly the gap between the actual and the
first-best level of output.
1
2 It remains an open question what exactly these
shocks are, and why they may be highly correlated with the actual level
of output, in which case only the conventional wisdom and the common
policy practice would be justifiable.
10. For the possibility that sunspots (or self-fulfilling expectations) determine which policy
instruments are effective and actively used in equilibrium, see Angeletos, Hellwig, and
Pa van (2003).
11. See Woodford (2003) for an extensive analysis of this issue.
12. These shocks are commonly called cost-push shocks, although they may have little to
do with real-life cost-push shocks, such as an increase in oil prices, which are bound to
affect both the actual and the first-best level of output and may have an ambiguous
effect on the level of the distortion in the economy. See Blanchard (2003) for a critical
assessment.Discussion • 361
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Discussion
Participants as well as discussants were concerned by the generality of the
authors' local linear-quadratic approximation approach. Mike Woodford
responded to the discussion of Stefania Albanesi that the advantage of
this approach over the approaches of Siu, Schmitt-Grohe, and other
authors is that analytic solutions for optimal policies can be obtained, and
optimal responses to shocks with general stochastic properties can be362 • DISCUSSION
calculated. He noted that the disadvantage of the linear-quadratic
approach is that very large shocks cannot be analyzed. Stefania Albanesi
noted that the linear-quadratic approximation is thus less likely to be
appropriate for analyzing the problems facing developing countries
where shocks are larger. Ken Rogoff said that, while on the one hand, ana-
lytic results can be useful for building intuition, on the other hand, it may
not be possible to answer every important question analytically.
Robert Hall was worried that the results of the paper place a huge
weight on the Calvo price adjustment mechanism and the Dixit-Stiglitz-
Spence model of imperfect competition. He questioned whether this is
how economies really work and whether the results are robust to more
general assumptions. Mike Woodford agreed that the results are subject to
assumptions about the form of distortions, including the form of sluggish
price adjustment. He noted that the aim of the paper is to analyze the
effect of sluggish price adjustment on optimal fiscal policy, something that
the literature has not investigated before. He also remarked that the
framework is quite flexible in allowing various distortions to be added or
taken away.
Andres Velasco was curious about the generality of the model result
that debt indexation is undesirable. Mike Woodford responded that when
prices are sticky, nominal debt is desirable, but the degree to which unex-
pected inflation is optimally used to achieve state contingency is limited.
Stefania Albanesi elaborated that the cost of not having state-contingent
debt depends on the size of shocks. When shocks are of the business-cycle
variety, as in the authors' framework, the costs of not having state-contin-
gent debt are small. Marios Angeletos remarked that it would be optimal
to have nominal debt but real assets. To add to Stefania Albanesi's point,
Angeletos noted that in the authors' exercise, the difference between nom-
inal and indexed debt is small because the optimal volatility of inflation
is, in any case, almost zero.
Several participants were curious about the ability of the authors'
framework to nest important policy concerns. John Williams asked
whether the linear-quadratic framework can allow for realistic distortions
such as the nonneutrality of the U.S. tax system with respect to inflation.
Mike Woodford responded that this can indeed be integrated into the
framework. Mark Gertler remarked that the old-fashioned argument that
lags in the implementation of fiscal policy make monetary policy a more
appropriate stabilization instrument was not taken account of by the
authors' framework. He was curious about the effect on optimal policy of
allowing for such. Mike Woodford responded that delays in fiscal policy
implementation are indeed realistic and can be included. He said that
even with lags in the implementation of fiscal policy, optimal monetaryDiscussion • 363
policy in the case of distortionary taxation is not the same as when all
taxes are lump sum because, with distortionary taxation, there is a
nonzero shadow value of additional resources to the government that the
monetary authority should take into account. On this question, Marios
Angeletos noted that in the linear-quadratic framework, thinking of fiscal
and monetary policy as independent is actually not a bad approximation.
Where shocks are big, however, this is much less likely to be an appropri-
ate assumption.
Ken Rogoff pointed out that political economy concerns were absent
from the authors' model, while in the real world, fiscal policy has effec-
tively been dismissed as a tool of stabilization because the degree of com-
mitment available to fiscal authorities is so limited. He was curious about
what type of institutional framework the authors envisaged for imple-
menting the optimal fiscal policy. Kjetil Storesletten suggested that the
authors do more to confront the time-consistency issue and work out the
time-consistent policy for their framework. Mike Woodford responded
that this could be done but that, in reality, governments appear to have
some ability to accept constraints on fiscal policy, as shown by their reluc-
tance to tax existing capital.